Fascinating interview, really enjoyed hearing you both. More please.
Two points:
1) Seth's argument that Hamas likely had no plan but to (quite rationally) reassert the Palestinian question back onto the world stage seems, at best, to only be half true.
If you believe someone like Daniel Sobelman (who is as sober as they come), they absolutely did have a plan which wasn't borne out of desperation but rather optimism and a perceived position of strategic strength vis a vis Israel. Sinwar genuinely believed that the Iranians, Hezbollah, Houthis, etc., would join full swing on Oct. 8 for "a war of the liberation of Jerusalem" (his words). His entire raison d'etre since at least 2019 was re-establishing military ties with Tehran! That everyone else chickened out was precisely what he *wasn't* expecting. Which leads to the familiar (but no less true) point that Hamas believed Israel's destruction to be practical, possible, and imminent. And given the remarkable success they had against Israel alone, they were perhaps quite rational to believe so.
Saudi normalization was a thorn in Sinwar's side, sure, but I think Seth is missing the forest for the trees here.
2) On Seth’s too-clever-by-half comparison between Ben-Gurion and Sinwar. Just a few moments after he talks about the 100,000 British refugees he says this:
“I want to say a few words to the Arabs who are here and who are not here…even though you are still opposing us, we want you to know that you have not throughout the entire world a more loyal and useful friend than the Jewish people. We will build our country on the foundations of Jewish prosperity and peace. The closer and more quickly we draw together, the better it will be both for us and for you. The Jewish people and the Arab people need each other in the fashioning of their future as free peoples in this part of the world. We are convinced with the revival of the Jewish State on the one hand and independent Arab unity on the other, we shall be able to cooperate closely in a spirit of mutual aid, in a true covenant of brothers. I am finished, sir, and I thank you for your attention."
Even if he doesn't believe half of this, are we really even remotely in the same universe as Sinwar's martyrology?
I think the other side of the coin of Seth's argument that Israel could/should have done more to promote the parts of Hamas open to compromise is that it also should have done more to destroy those parts of Hamas not amenable to compromise. Sinwar should not have come out of prison alive.
I think I am going to write an article about Ben Gurion's views on the Arabs. I'm coming more and more round to the view that Ben Gurion was a top lad.
My favourite fact about Ben-Gurion is how he refused to even address Menachem Begin by name, but instead only referred to him in the Knesset as "the man sitting next to Mr. Bader".
After reading noted Israeli rightoid Gil Samsonov's book "The Likud Princes", I came away with the overwhelming impression (not at all the author's intention, btw) that had that gang gotten anywhere even near* power in Israel's early decades, they would have turned it into a pariah state about 50 years earlier. A fair number of the founding Irgun families had members espousing such psycho and unrealistic policies they were too much even for Begin himself and so were expelled from the party.
It's astounding how many of them really were too pig-headed to realise Ben Gurion and Mapai had essentially the same expansionist goals they did, they just weren't rigidly ideological retards about pursuing them. BG transparently foresaw how toxic openly Revisionist Zionism would be internationally, to say nothing of Religious Zionism which wasn't really on the political radar until the 1980s.
To a large degree I think private American aid/donations are responsible for eliminating the normal restraints and self-preservation instincts that under other circumstances would have prevented the current ascendancy of such groups in Israel.
I'm not really sure what that constituency meant at that time, I always saw them synonymous with the Settler Movement. Did Kook make the same sort of statements as Dov Lior but hedge it with warning that the Jews were still too weak to act on various anti-gentile precepts?
The original Kook was a big hippy. He believed in racial supremacism (famously he said the superiority of a Jew over a gentile is greater than that of a gentile over an animal), but he believed this supremacy was expressed through universal benevolence. Supposedly he would not kill insects or even pick a leaf from a tree unless for a higher purpose. His son toned that down, but he still refused to approve settlements on land confiscated by the government. He was a big believer in the idea that Arabs in 1948 left because the Arab countries told them too.
However, the main thing is that Kookism was a tiny fringe movement before 1967. The Religious Zionist party before 1967 (which usually was split into two parties) were really the purest Herzleans, and, in as much as they mixed in religion, it was to say that Zionism had to be highly ethical.
One genuinely bad thing Ben Gurion did was treat them with total disdain and generally humiliate them because he was convinced that their children would become labour zionists.
> Sinwar genuinely believed that the Iranians, Hezbollah, Houthis, etc., would join full swing on Oct. 8 for "a war of the liberation of Jerusalem" (his words).
I really, really don't consider this plausible. I don't think any serious person expected, at that point, that an offensive war aimed at militarily capturing Jerusalem was in the cards. Even if Israel was beaten, the probability of which was debatable, the U.S. government absolutely wouldn't have allowed it, and would have emptied the treasury and the reserves to prevent it.
I mean, sure, I guess. But you need to contend with some pretty significant concrete evidence to the contrary. Here are just two excerpts from Sobelman's article ("The Strategic Origins of Hamas’s October 7 Attack," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism) which I based my own claim on. I suppose you could say everything below is just Israeli propaganda, that these documents don't exist, that they were mistranslated by cynical Mossad agents, etc. But then who would be the neurotic?
"From Hamas’s vantage point, tighter military cooperation with Hezbollah would enable it to operate against Israel from the Lebanese front with impunity, as Israel would presumably be deterred and otherwise restrained from operating in Lebanon. Moreover, under certain circumstances, Hezbollah and the Axis could be deliberately entangled in a Hamas-initiated war with Israel. This was reflected in a Hamas “working paper” composed by Yahya al-Sinwar’s office in 2019 and seized by the IDF in 2024. Having been appointed as Hamas’s leader in the Gaza Strip in 2017, Al-Sinwar sought to restore the movement’s ties with Tehran. [39] Issued ahead of a high-level Hamas visit to Tehran, the first since 2012, the document outlined Hamas’s and Iran’s interests. It noted Hamas’s aspiration for a “joint defensive alliance” with both the IRGC Quds Force and Hezbollah “to prepare for the war of the liberation of Jerusalem and activate all fronts against the shared enemy, Israel.” It noted the need to “prepare a timetable and operational plan for waging an all-front offensive that would catch the enemy by surprise.” [40] This reflected a shift in Hamas’s concept. Over the next few years, it would begin to view Israel’s destruction as more practical. [41] Evidence to this effect is presented in subsequent sections."
"For Hamas, Guardian of the Walls was an inflection point in the conflict. Over the next few months, this would be represented in its leaders’ public statements. Days into the cease-fire, Al-Sinwar stated, “There already exists a prepared scenario, and we just conducted a dress rehearsal for it. Gaza will come out in all its force and its resistance. And the West Bank will explode in all its force. And our brethren in the occupied lands inside [Israel] will uprise.” [59] Haniyah followed suit, tellingly characterizing the conflict as “a dress rehearsal for the full liberation” of Palestine. [60] From this point on, Hamas’s maximalist strategic discourse regarding the “removal” of Israel would gradually become a concrete plan. In private communications, but occasionally in his public statements as well, Al-Sinwar employed the most dramatic of terms, effectively setting the stage for October 7. This profound development was lost on Israel, whose leaders erroneously presented the conflict a resounding achievement."
I mean, that's not much evidence of anything. "Hezbollah wants closer cooperation with Iran" is as obvious as "Israel wants more aid from America". "Prepare for the war for Jerusalem" is the same as AI people saying "prepare for AGI" and Israelis saying "prepare for a nuclear Iran". It's something that *must* perpetually be imminent for ideological reasons.
You don't see partisan organizations saying "Hey, things are fucked, we've got to try something because the alternative is sitting here and letting them genocide us". That wouldn't be very inspiring.
I think “they’re crazy and do things for no reason” should be an explanation of last resort. If the sensible, generic narrative lines up with the action observed, it’s much more likely to be true.
“They were cornered and had to choose between being gradually killed off and trying whatever they could“ has a high prior and reliably produces what we saw. “They had a zany, convoluted plan only perceptible by analyzing agitprop and speeches at rallies“ has a low prior and could be used to explain any action they might possibly have taken.
The two are not at all mutually exclusive though. It’s quite possible, and arguably plausible, that they did indeed feel “cornered” (by the looming Saudi deal; no prospect to end the blockade; entrenching of the West Bank de-facto annexation under Smotrich and Ben Gvir), and also were quite optimistic regarding what a big offensive in which both Hezb and Iran would fully join in achieve. This article is pretty interesting in that regard, depending on how much credence you want to give it’s sourcing:
(Something similar can be said about Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. He arguably did both feel cornered and was overoptimistic of what he could achieve; and in both cases once the campaign started its very hard to cut it short, even as it turned out more disastrous than imagined)
"It's something that *must* perpetually be imminent for ideological reasons."
Exactly!
But the very obvious conclusion one draws from Sobelman's evidence is that since (at least) 2019 Sinwar's eschatology stopped being just eschatology and became a guide for actionable military strategy. If you need to call such an evaluation "Israeli neuroticism" to sleep better at night, so be it.
Great interview! Possibly the first time I’ve heard informed, thoughtful and thought-provoking views on Israel/Palestine from a self-described socialist activist. Didn’t know that kind of creature existed.
Interesting. A few thoughts. If you didn’t think the Jewish lobby was a big deal before I don’t think the Iran War should change your mind. Keep in mind that Bibi and Israel and the lobby had been pushing for this for more than 20 years and every single administration (Democrat, Republican, even Trump’s first term) laughed them out of the room. It was arguably at the point that the lobby has been the weakest it’s ever been (dependent solely on Republicans, persona non grata with the Democrats) that Bibi convinced the most retarded president to do it over the objections of his secretary of state and vice president and that was because Venezuela had poisoned his mind with “you can just do things”-itis and because he’s surrounded himself with lickspittles who couldn’t get jobs even at republican think tanks.
I found myself a little frustrated/confused when you asked him how should we figure out if the true statements Palestinian leadership makes are to their people (we’re using whatever concessions we can get to make more war) or to us (real peace) and he first responded with it’s impossible to maintain a conspiracy among your population to pretend you want peace and then turn around and do war. Then he kind of said look all politicians lie all the time to keep their options open so there is no truth anyway and all you can do is make the situation so good for Palestinians that they won’t want to go back to war. There’s a lot of problems with this - for one, as he appears to acknowledge, Hamas has a lot of factions and they the gamut on the issue of long-ish term peace to eternal war so you don’t need a conspiracy, you just need to keep telling the different factions what they want to hear. Second, Bibi’s conception pre-October 7 was improving the lives of Gazans in exchange for peace and clearly Hamas decided to go to war anyway. Third, irrespective of whether the populace at large wants to go to war, Hamas does not need to convince them one way or the other - you don’t need consent to start a war. You can just send 1,000 guys over the fence and you’ve got more war than you can handle. Fourth, even if the Palestinian government is gung ho on peace, the question is also whether they can stop the craziest most violent most revanchist Palestinians from restarting the war. I wouldn’t really be frightened of a militarized Palestinian state - the problem is the combination of a weak state faced with strong terrorist militias as in Lebanon and the West Bank is a receipe for peace agreeements not being worth much.
For my own money, what I think the Israelis should do is a full permanent settlement freeze, announce that Israeli policy is the creation of an independent Palestinian state but that they will only agree to one if their conditions are met through negotiations. Otherwise the territories will remain in trust (i.e. no new settlements of any kind under any conditions) until the Israelis are comfortable with the agreement. But there’s a lot of risk there.
Just hand the West Bank back to the kingdom of Jordan. It's such an obvious solution and the logical next step after the failure of outsourcing security to the Palestinian Authority. And like NonZionism says, if I were Palestinian, I wouldn't accept the 2-State-Solution farce. Jordan gets an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea and the contours of a viably-sized state.
This was, in my view, clearly the most disastrous mistake Israel has made. It's also a very big flaw in Seth's articles that he misses it out. Despite what he says, I think he is just much too sympathetic to Palestinian nationalism as an ideal and movement.
Yes, I think if one genuinely wants the best realistic deal for the Palestinians, the liquidation of Palestinian Nationalism is one of the most important steps. There's an argument to be made that the adoption of this 19th Century Sacred Blood & Soil model of Palestinian identity scuttled popular Arab support for other workable peace agreements.
Reading this history of Gaza last year (author is some kind of French leftist, but again, no rightoid would write an intellectually rigorous monograph like this), I was really struck but the interest of the King of Jordan decades after 1967 in not only eventually getting the West Bank back, but even his openness to governing the Gaza Strip.
One of the dumbest Hasbara lies I've frequently heard is how the Jordanian monarchy was "secretly glad" to have "been relieved of the burden of governing the West Bank and its Palestinians", as if the overwhelming majority of his subjects weren't Palestinian-origin already.
Interestingly and relatedly, "Black September", which gets constantly cited as an example of inherent Palestinian ungovernability and them deserving what's since come to them, was in large part triggered by the economic collapse of Jordan as a direct consequence of them losing the Six Day War, all their WB investments, half their population, and coping with a sudden refugee crisis borne of it.
That's the point, the Jordanians very much did want it until the First Intifada finally broke out after 2 decades of occupation and Jordan decided an deconial style counterinsurgency wasn't their problem to deal with. It feels like a very classic example of “you break it, you buy it” on the part of Israel.
Successful microstates all tend to be islands, quiet tax havens, have good relations with neighbours and have a political culture that's happy with their microstatus. A Palestinian state would be none of those things. And as Likudniks love to say, Jordan is a defacto Palestinian state anyway that's been doing ok.
Right, it would have been a good idea a long time ago, but not now because none of the relevant parties want it.
As to size, these are arguments against a Palestinian state of any size. If they can't have a microstate why would they be better with a marginally larger state?
I also think, for young'uns (people born after 1980) like me, we don't realize how much Iran as a bogeymen and agent of American national humiliation was a deep feature of the 1980s--famously the era when Donald Trump formed all of his lasting political opinions.
I was well aware of the Simpsons gag Seth mentioned, but for me it was always a bit retro: like the references to Japanese cars or S&Ls. But then you see how much Trump's protectionism seems to still be a legacy of the Japanese rise in the 80s and realize, for someone like Trump, this stuff was way more than fodder for a throwaway gag.
It's clear that Israel was the only major constituency who wanted a war with Iran, but it's also clear to actually get it they needed a guy at the perfect intersection of 80-s brained Iran hostility, aggression, carelessness, and malleability by slick presentation. The fact that they couldn't sell _Rubio_ on the war shows that even a mainstream neocon administration wouldn't have folded over to just straight up give Israel what they want.
Clearly a very intelligent guy. But it's a bit hard to apply general political conflict heuristics when there are absolutely bonkers levels of anti-Jewish ideology in every surrounding state. Even the states that have peace with Israel have insanely anti-Jewish populations. This was the point of your Egypt question, and I don't think he had a good response.
Also, I don't think the Iran attack was so weird that it requires us to believe that the US support for Israel is darkly mysterious. Trump wants to defeat America's long time enemies. It probably doesn't hurt that Iran has tried to kill him personally. He got a win in Venezuela, he's looking for a win in Cuba, and he thought he could get a win in Iran.
Bringing down a government through bombing is something that has never happened in human history, coupled with the danger to global energy flows it was an extremely high-risk low chance of reward decision. Given how genuinely shocked most of its partisans in the US seem that Trump was not willing to escalate to some kind of ground campaign or at least maintaining the bombing and double blockade for many months it seems clear to many they were aware the story they were selling Trump and his supporters was a lie. They were telling him what he wanted to hear believing he would allow mission creep to do what they really wanted, another Iraq.
Right, I should have been more explicit. It seems from his perspective that at the very least Iran would have its missile and nuclear program blown up, and there was some chance the people would rise up again and regime would fall. Heuristics from history are not helpful here, since the Venezuela op was sui generis, as was taking out Khamenei in the opening salvo. It seems they also believed Iran wouldn't close the straight since it would result in a blockade of Iran (which is what happened). Clearly faulty assumptions ex post, but not so stupid ex ante. Again my only point is that you don't have to appeal to some weird and unhealthy relationship to Israel to explain it.
I think you still do. Only Trump would have signed off on Bibi's request, but only Bibi would make such a request. Simple comparison: Pakistan has an issue with Afghanistan right now; it's a US ally, and the Afghanistani Taliban is a long-standing enemy. So why doesn't Pakistan ask America to invade Afghanistan?
The steelman counterargument is that Israel had constructed a narrative in which the U.S. would get a win after a few missiles rendered the government incapable of overcoming a supposedly overwhelming domestic opposition. A few days, no boots on the ground, big victory celebration with no risk taken.
It was a stupid narrative, and it's obvious that Israel has undue influence in the U.S., but surrounding Trump with people who repeated it uncritically was how they got a generally anti-neoconservative president (who just knew nothing about Iran or about war, apparently) to sign on.
Comparison between the US and Egypt in the willingness to go to war of the average person is insane. Playing right into the whole "this is the middle east" "fight in Arabic" argument.
Within the same vein, nobody on the right is questioning what the Arabs want. Maybe we are wrong but nobody on our side is asking that question because every house in Gaza and Judea and Samaria have pictures of all of Israel in Arabic and the Haram AlSharif. I would add that as far the question of what they want now vs later, of course we have an answer. The updated Hamas charter says they want the 67 borders now because it will allow them to more easily achieve the 48 borders later.
The idea that as a statesman I should be able to make the Arabs want what I want is more manipulative western thinking. As Rabbi Kahane said (something like) " I understand the Arabs, the Arabs understand me and we both think you're nuts". This guy literally admits to not interacting with Palestinian people whereas the average right winger in Israel is on a daily basis. His idea of a sane person is clearly a western archetype. The idea that their documents show one thing or another is irrelevant as you both articulated in the beginning they lie to both sides. The idea that some sort of impossible and grinding struggle doesn't appeal to a large portion of not majority Arab society is not only wrong it shows a complete lack of understanding of Islamic martyr culture even outside of religion groups.
As far the need to crack the books I'm not sure how much more the right needs to know. With guys like Dr. Kedar on the right it doesn't really seem like a complaint on the Israeli right but rather the Anglo - Jewish right. I would add that the Arabs are not cracking books, and so if you think that as the Nukhba terrorist storms your kibbutz you can save yourself by quoting Anwar Shaul or Shimon Ballas is silly.
2) It's not remotely true that the average Israeli right winger interacts with Arabs on a daily basis.
3) Who really listens to Kedar? His plan is the Emirates thing. What effort has been put into that? I think he's just wheeled on as a token guy to prove the Right understands Arabs, but his actual ideas are basically ignored.
4) I think lefties understand the facts of the conflict a lot better than Zionists, but they are playing with a massive handicap by not understanding HBD.
1) it's good for manipulation of westerners, we are manipulating a very different people.
2) I'll concede but I meant really residents of Judea and Samaria.
3) he is more popular than ever, even if people don't go for the Emirates thing he's never had more eyes and ears on him. He is without a doubt a major influence. Dr. BenAri (whether you agree with his conclusions or not) published his last book which is just a history lesson on Arabs and Islam.
4) I don't think amassing literacy in obscure Arab/Israeli politics from the 1920’s makes there understanding superior and the center right in Israel has as many history autists as the left especially all the center left guys that have reluctantly joined the right post Oct 7. Basically every interview of an ex-general or Shabak commander on Arutz Tov. The handicap of not understanding HBD and Islam is exactly why the understanding of the left is lacking when compared to the right no matter how much knowledge they amass. When you are a western atheist you have a lot longer way to go to understanding Arabs than the right. Mizrachi anti-zionism WAS a relevant thing for example . Anyways how much info do I really need? Read a little Raphael Patai, maybe a once over of the Quaran and I think the average Joe probably gets the idea that peace doesn't have to be an option in the Islamic hand. It's very clear that over intellectualization of the conflict is a handicap on the left, the Arabs are quite aware of that and use it to manipulate the “PFLP LARPers in the west”.
1) The mindset is correct, but it requires accurate anthropology to work.
2) Also not true. People in Gush settlements probably know fewer Arabs than I do. You're talking about like 20,000 people maybe. And they also meet an unrepresentative group of Arabs.
3) I don't see it, but maybe I'm not clued in. I think Ben Ari is full of shit, but he is better than the rest.
4) Rightists also don't understand HBD, for obvious reasons. They try and approximate it through demonising Arabs. Maybe a few decades ago this was a reasonable approximation, but it's become ever more hysterical.
It reminds me of a joint PFLP Antifa protest I attended outside of Shaar Yaffo. The Arab youth and the antifa were kept sperate being managed by an Arab school teacher in the middle. I approached the shabab and told them the antifa Jews were all pro LGBT stuff and almost caused a mob on mob clash. The teacher started having to yell that I was lying and all the antifa guys were just /our Jews/ or something. When I tried the same shtick on the antifa guy he said the Arabs were just good commies, literally as the Arab teacher who had been giving a speech started an Allah Akbar chant. It's a farce.
Ackerman's points about bloviating of Arab leaders usually being for their own rube domestic audiences rather than any reflection of their true undestanding of the world applies even more so to Iran. Ironically Israel spent most of the 1980s urging to the USA this "understanding" of Iran, i.e not to take their firebrand rhetoric seriously and rather see it as part of Iran's (failed) attempt to claim moral leadership in the Middle-East via the Palestine issues, among other things.
This gradually changed over the 1990s as continued hostility led to real Iranian actions in that sphere finally matching rhetoric.
I am inclined to agree with Non-Zionism's arguments about democracy in Egypt, given the total monkeys elected to government in Israel, I don't think it can really be overstated how much a danger Egypt could be to itself and the region if it were given "free, fair and open" elections.
Fascinating interview, really enjoyed hearing you both. More please.
Two points:
1) Seth's argument that Hamas likely had no plan but to (quite rationally) reassert the Palestinian question back onto the world stage seems, at best, to only be half true.
If you believe someone like Daniel Sobelman (who is as sober as they come), they absolutely did have a plan which wasn't borne out of desperation but rather optimism and a perceived position of strategic strength vis a vis Israel. Sinwar genuinely believed that the Iranians, Hezbollah, Houthis, etc., would join full swing on Oct. 8 for "a war of the liberation of Jerusalem" (his words). His entire raison d'etre since at least 2019 was re-establishing military ties with Tehran! That everyone else chickened out was precisely what he *wasn't* expecting. Which leads to the familiar (but no less true) point that Hamas believed Israel's destruction to be practical, possible, and imminent. And given the remarkable success they had against Israel alone, they were perhaps quite rational to believe so.
Saudi normalization was a thorn in Sinwar's side, sure, but I think Seth is missing the forest for the trees here.
2) On Seth’s too-clever-by-half comparison between Ben-Gurion and Sinwar. Just a few moments after he talks about the 100,000 British refugees he says this:
“I want to say a few words to the Arabs who are here and who are not here…even though you are still opposing us, we want you to know that you have not throughout the entire world a more loyal and useful friend than the Jewish people. We will build our country on the foundations of Jewish prosperity and peace. The closer and more quickly we draw together, the better it will be both for us and for you. The Jewish people and the Arab people need each other in the fashioning of their future as free peoples in this part of the world. We are convinced with the revival of the Jewish State on the one hand and independent Arab unity on the other, we shall be able to cooperate closely in a spirit of mutual aid, in a true covenant of brothers. I am finished, sir, and I thank you for your attention."
Even if he doesn't believe half of this, are we really even remotely in the same universe as Sinwar's martyrology?
I think the other side of the coin of Seth's argument that Israel could/should have done more to promote the parts of Hamas open to compromise is that it also should have done more to destroy those parts of Hamas not amenable to compromise. Sinwar should not have come out of prison alive.
I think I am going to write an article about Ben Gurion's views on the Arabs. I'm coming more and more round to the view that Ben Gurion was a top lad.
My favourite fact about Ben-Gurion is how he refused to even address Menachem Begin by name, but instead only referred to him in the Knesset as "the man sitting next to Mr. Bader".
After reading noted Israeli rightoid Gil Samsonov's book "The Likud Princes", I came away with the overwhelming impression (not at all the author's intention, btw) that had that gang gotten anywhere even near* power in Israel's early decades, they would have turned it into a pariah state about 50 years earlier. A fair number of the founding Irgun families had members espousing such psycho and unrealistic policies they were too much even for Begin himself and so were expelled from the party.
It's astounding how many of them really were too pig-headed to realise Ben Gurion and Mapai had essentially the same expansionist goals they did, they just weren't rigidly ideological retards about pursuing them. BG transparently foresaw how toxic openly Revisionist Zionism would be internationally, to say nothing of Religious Zionism which wasn't really on the political radar until the 1980s.
To a large degree I think private American aid/donations are responsible for eliminating the normal restraints and self-preservation instincts that under other circumstances would have prevented the current ascendancy of such groups in Israel.
Religious Zionists until 1967 were consistently the most dovish members of the kenesset except for literal communists.
I'm not really sure what that constituency meant at that time, I always saw them synonymous with the Settler Movement. Did Kook make the same sort of statements as Dov Lior but hedge it with warning that the Jews were still too weak to act on various anti-gentile precepts?
The original Kook was a big hippy. He believed in racial supremacism (famously he said the superiority of a Jew over a gentile is greater than that of a gentile over an animal), but he believed this supremacy was expressed through universal benevolence. Supposedly he would not kill insects or even pick a leaf from a tree unless for a higher purpose. His son toned that down, but he still refused to approve settlements on land confiscated by the government. He was a big believer in the idea that Arabs in 1948 left because the Arab countries told them too.
However, the main thing is that Kookism was a tiny fringe movement before 1967. The Religious Zionist party before 1967 (which usually was split into two parties) were really the purest Herzleans, and, in as much as they mixed in religion, it was to say that Zionism had to be highly ethical.
One genuinely bad thing Ben Gurion did was treat them with total disdain and generally humiliate them because he was convinced that their children would become labour zionists.
> Sinwar genuinely believed that the Iranians, Hezbollah, Houthis, etc., would join full swing on Oct. 8 for "a war of the liberation of Jerusalem" (his words).
I really, really don't consider this plausible. I don't think any serious person expected, at that point, that an offensive war aimed at militarily capturing Jerusalem was in the cards. Even if Israel was beaten, the probability of which was debatable, the U.S. government absolutely wouldn't have allowed it, and would have emptied the treasury and the reserves to prevent it.
It reads like standard Israeli neuroticism.
I mean, sure, I guess. But you need to contend with some pretty significant concrete evidence to the contrary. Here are just two excerpts from Sobelman's article ("The Strategic Origins of Hamas’s October 7 Attack," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism) which I based my own claim on. I suppose you could say everything below is just Israeli propaganda, that these documents don't exist, that they were mistranslated by cynical Mossad agents, etc. But then who would be the neurotic?
"From Hamas’s vantage point, tighter military cooperation with Hezbollah would enable it to operate against Israel from the Lebanese front with impunity, as Israel would presumably be deterred and otherwise restrained from operating in Lebanon. Moreover, under certain circumstances, Hezbollah and the Axis could be deliberately entangled in a Hamas-initiated war with Israel. This was reflected in a Hamas “working paper” composed by Yahya al-Sinwar’s office in 2019 and seized by the IDF in 2024. Having been appointed as Hamas’s leader in the Gaza Strip in 2017, Al-Sinwar sought to restore the movement’s ties with Tehran. [39] Issued ahead of a high-level Hamas visit to Tehran, the first since 2012, the document outlined Hamas’s and Iran’s interests. It noted Hamas’s aspiration for a “joint defensive alliance” with both the IRGC Quds Force and Hezbollah “to prepare for the war of the liberation of Jerusalem and activate all fronts against the shared enemy, Israel.” It noted the need to “prepare a timetable and operational plan for waging an all-front offensive that would catch the enemy by surprise.” [40] This reflected a shift in Hamas’s concept. Over the next few years, it would begin to view Israel’s destruction as more practical. [41] Evidence to this effect is presented in subsequent sections."
"For Hamas, Guardian of the Walls was an inflection point in the conflict. Over the next few months, this would be represented in its leaders’ public statements. Days into the cease-fire, Al-Sinwar stated, “There already exists a prepared scenario, and we just conducted a dress rehearsal for it. Gaza will come out in all its force and its resistance. And the West Bank will explode in all its force. And our brethren in the occupied lands inside [Israel] will uprise.” [59] Haniyah followed suit, tellingly characterizing the conflict as “a dress rehearsal for the full liberation” of Palestine. [60] From this point on, Hamas’s maximalist strategic discourse regarding the “removal” of Israel would gradually become a concrete plan. In private communications, but occasionally in his public statements as well, Al-Sinwar employed the most dramatic of terms, effectively setting the stage for October 7. This profound development was lost on Israel, whose leaders erroneously presented the conflict a resounding achievement."
I mean, that's not much evidence of anything. "Hezbollah wants closer cooperation with Iran" is as obvious as "Israel wants more aid from America". "Prepare for the war for Jerusalem" is the same as AI people saying "prepare for AGI" and Israelis saying "prepare for a nuclear Iran". It's something that *must* perpetually be imminent for ideological reasons.
You don't see partisan organizations saying "Hey, things are fucked, we've got to try something because the alternative is sitting here and letting them genocide us". That wouldn't be very inspiring.
As I said to Seth, if Israelis are always getting high off their own supply and doing crazy stuff, I don't see why Palestinians can't.
I think “they’re crazy and do things for no reason” should be an explanation of last resort. If the sensible, generic narrative lines up with the action observed, it’s much more likely to be true.
“They were cornered and had to choose between being gradually killed off and trying whatever they could“ has a high prior and reliably produces what we saw. “They had a zany, convoluted plan only perceptible by analyzing agitprop and speeches at rallies“ has a low prior and could be used to explain any action they might possibly have taken.
The two are not at all mutually exclusive though. It’s quite possible, and arguably plausible, that they did indeed feel “cornered” (by the looming Saudi deal; no prospect to end the blockade; entrenching of the West Bank de-facto annexation under Smotrich and Ben Gvir), and also were quite optimistic regarding what a big offensive in which both Hezb and Iran would fully join in achieve. This article is pretty interesting in that regard, depending on how much credence you want to give it’s sourcing:
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-04-05/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/hamas-actually-believed-it-would-conquer-israel-and-divided-it-into-cantons/0000018e-ab4a-dc42-a3de-abfad6fe0000?gift=50645f0b5a80408cb3a4e8f09a9ff550
(Something similar can be said about Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. He arguably did both feel cornered and was overoptimistic of what he could achieve; and in both cases once the campaign started its very hard to cut it short, even as it turned out more disastrous than imagined)
"It's something that *must* perpetually be imminent for ideological reasons."
Exactly!
But the very obvious conclusion one draws from Sobelman's evidence is that since (at least) 2019 Sinwar's eschatology stopped being just eschatology and became a guide for actionable military strategy. If you need to call such an evaluation "Israeli neuroticism" to sleep better at night, so be it.
Great interview! Possibly the first time I’ve heard informed, thoughtful and thought-provoking views on Israel/Palestine from a self-described socialist activist. Didn’t know that kind of creature existed.
Excellent exchange. Your publication has become one of my absolute favourites. You should continue the podcast.
Interesting. A few thoughts. If you didn’t think the Jewish lobby was a big deal before I don’t think the Iran War should change your mind. Keep in mind that Bibi and Israel and the lobby had been pushing for this for more than 20 years and every single administration (Democrat, Republican, even Trump’s first term) laughed them out of the room. It was arguably at the point that the lobby has been the weakest it’s ever been (dependent solely on Republicans, persona non grata with the Democrats) that Bibi convinced the most retarded president to do it over the objections of his secretary of state and vice president and that was because Venezuela had poisoned his mind with “you can just do things”-itis and because he’s surrounded himself with lickspittles who couldn’t get jobs even at republican think tanks.
I found myself a little frustrated/confused when you asked him how should we figure out if the true statements Palestinian leadership makes are to their people (we’re using whatever concessions we can get to make more war) or to us (real peace) and he first responded with it’s impossible to maintain a conspiracy among your population to pretend you want peace and then turn around and do war. Then he kind of said look all politicians lie all the time to keep their options open so there is no truth anyway and all you can do is make the situation so good for Palestinians that they won’t want to go back to war. There’s a lot of problems with this - for one, as he appears to acknowledge, Hamas has a lot of factions and they the gamut on the issue of long-ish term peace to eternal war so you don’t need a conspiracy, you just need to keep telling the different factions what they want to hear. Second, Bibi’s conception pre-October 7 was improving the lives of Gazans in exchange for peace and clearly Hamas decided to go to war anyway. Third, irrespective of whether the populace at large wants to go to war, Hamas does not need to convince them one way or the other - you don’t need consent to start a war. You can just send 1,000 guys over the fence and you’ve got more war than you can handle. Fourth, even if the Palestinian government is gung ho on peace, the question is also whether they can stop the craziest most violent most revanchist Palestinians from restarting the war. I wouldn’t really be frightened of a militarized Palestinian state - the problem is the combination of a weak state faced with strong terrorist militias as in Lebanon and the West Bank is a receipe for peace agreeements not being worth much.
For my own money, what I think the Israelis should do is a full permanent settlement freeze, announce that Israeli policy is the creation of an independent Palestinian state but that they will only agree to one if their conditions are met through negotiations. Otherwise the territories will remain in trust (i.e. no new settlements of any kind under any conditions) until the Israelis are comfortable with the agreement. But there’s a lot of risk there.
Just hand the West Bank back to the kingdom of Jordan. It's such an obvious solution and the logical next step after the failure of outsourcing security to the Palestinian Authority. And like NonZionism says, if I were Palestinian, I wouldn't accept the 2-State-Solution farce. Jordan gets an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea and the contours of a viably-sized state.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peres%E2%80%93Hussein_London_Agreement
This was, in my view, clearly the most disastrous mistake Israel has made. It's also a very big flaw in Seth's articles that he misses it out. Despite what he says, I think he is just much too sympathetic to Palestinian nationalism as an ideal and movement.
Yes, I think if one genuinely wants the best realistic deal for the Palestinians, the liquidation of Palestinian Nationalism is one of the most important steps. There's an argument to be made that the adoption of this 19th Century Sacred Blood & Soil model of Palestinian identity scuttled popular Arab support for other workable peace agreements.
Reading this history of Gaza last year (author is some kind of French leftist, but again, no rightoid would write an intellectually rigorous monograph like this), I was really struck but the interest of the King of Jordan decades after 1967 in not only eventually getting the West Bank back, but even his openness to governing the Gaza Strip.
One of the dumbest Hasbara lies I've frequently heard is how the Jordanian monarchy was "secretly glad" to have "been relieved of the burden of governing the West Bank and its Palestinians", as if the overwhelming majority of his subjects weren't Palestinian-origin already.
Interestingly and relatedly, "Black September", which gets constantly cited as an example of inherent Palestinian ungovernability and them deserving what's since come to them, was in large part triggered by the economic collapse of Jordan as a direct consequence of them losing the Six Day War, all their WB investments, half their population, and coping with a sudden refugee crisis borne of it.
https://x.com/haravayin_hogh/status/1955500773850386770
Most Jordanians nowadays believe the PLO was justified anyway
Yeah Shamir just sucked.
But neither the Jordanians nor the Palestinians want it, so what are we talking about?
ETA: I don't agree with the idea that a Palestinian rump state is not a viable state. Size has very little to do with viability.
That's the point, the Jordanians very much did want it until the First Intifada finally broke out after 2 decades of occupation and Jordan decided an deconial style counterinsurgency wasn't their problem to deal with. It feels like a very classic example of “you break it, you buy it” on the part of Israel.
Successful microstates all tend to be islands, quiet tax havens, have good relations with neighbours and have a political culture that's happy with their microstatus. A Palestinian state would be none of those things. And as Likudniks love to say, Jordan is a defacto Palestinian state anyway that's been doing ok.
Right, it would have been a good idea a long time ago, but not now because none of the relevant parties want it.
As to size, these are arguments against a Palestinian state of any size. If they can't have a microstate why would they be better with a marginally larger state?
I also think, for young'uns (people born after 1980) like me, we don't realize how much Iran as a bogeymen and agent of American national humiliation was a deep feature of the 1980s--famously the era when Donald Trump formed all of his lasting political opinions.
I was well aware of the Simpsons gag Seth mentioned, but for me it was always a bit retro: like the references to Japanese cars or S&Ls. But then you see how much Trump's protectionism seems to still be a legacy of the Japanese rise in the 80s and realize, for someone like Trump, this stuff was way more than fodder for a throwaway gag.
It's clear that Israel was the only major constituency who wanted a war with Iran, but it's also clear to actually get it they needed a guy at the perfect intersection of 80-s brained Iran hostility, aggression, carelessness, and malleability by slick presentation. The fact that they couldn't sell _Rubio_ on the war shows that even a mainstream neocon administration wouldn't have folded over to just straight up give Israel what they want.
Clearly a very intelligent guy. But it's a bit hard to apply general political conflict heuristics when there are absolutely bonkers levels of anti-Jewish ideology in every surrounding state. Even the states that have peace with Israel have insanely anti-Jewish populations. This was the point of your Egypt question, and I don't think he had a good response.
Yes, Zionists way over-index on THIS IS THE MIDDLE EAST, but this is, indeed, the Middle East.
Also, I don't think the Iran attack was so weird that it requires us to believe that the US support for Israel is darkly mysterious. Trump wants to defeat America's long time enemies. It probably doesn't hurt that Iran has tried to kill him personally. He got a win in Venezuela, he's looking for a win in Cuba, and he thought he could get a win in Iran.
Bringing down a government through bombing is something that has never happened in human history, coupled with the danger to global energy flows it was an extremely high-risk low chance of reward decision. Given how genuinely shocked most of its partisans in the US seem that Trump was not willing to escalate to some kind of ground campaign or at least maintaining the bombing and double blockade for many months it seems clear to many they were aware the story they were selling Trump and his supporters was a lie. They were telling him what he wanted to hear believing he would allow mission creep to do what they really wanted, another Iraq.
Right, I should have been more explicit. It seems from his perspective that at the very least Iran would have its missile and nuclear program blown up, and there was some chance the people would rise up again and regime would fall. Heuristics from history are not helpful here, since the Venezuela op was sui generis, as was taking out Khamenei in the opening salvo. It seems they also believed Iran wouldn't close the straight since it would result in a blockade of Iran (which is what happened). Clearly faulty assumptions ex post, but not so stupid ex ante. Again my only point is that you don't have to appeal to some weird and unhealthy relationship to Israel to explain it.
I think you still do. Only Trump would have signed off on Bibi's request, but only Bibi would make such a request. Simple comparison: Pakistan has an issue with Afghanistan right now; it's a US ally, and the Afghanistani Taliban is a long-standing enemy. So why doesn't Pakistan ask America to invade Afghanistan?
The steelman counterargument is that Israel had constructed a narrative in which the U.S. would get a win after a few missiles rendered the government incapable of overcoming a supposedly overwhelming domestic opposition. A few days, no boots on the ground, big victory celebration with no risk taken.
It was a stupid narrative, and it's obvious that Israel has undue influence in the U.S., but surrounding Trump with people who repeated it uncritically was how they got a generally anti-neoconservative president (who just knew nothing about Iran or about war, apparently) to sign on.
Comparison between the US and Egypt in the willingness to go to war of the average person is insane. Playing right into the whole "this is the middle east" "fight in Arabic" argument.
Agreed.
Within the same vein, nobody on the right is questioning what the Arabs want. Maybe we are wrong but nobody on our side is asking that question because every house in Gaza and Judea and Samaria have pictures of all of Israel in Arabic and the Haram AlSharif. I would add that as far the question of what they want now vs later, of course we have an answer. The updated Hamas charter says they want the 67 borders now because it will allow them to more easily achieve the 48 borders later.
The idea that as a statesman I should be able to make the Arabs want what I want is more manipulative western thinking. As Rabbi Kahane said (something like) " I understand the Arabs, the Arabs understand me and we both think you're nuts". This guy literally admits to not interacting with Palestinian people whereas the average right winger in Israel is on a daily basis. His idea of a sane person is clearly a western archetype. The idea that their documents show one thing or another is irrelevant as you both articulated in the beginning they lie to both sides. The idea that some sort of impossible and grinding struggle doesn't appeal to a large portion of not majority Arab society is not only wrong it shows a complete lack of understanding of Islamic martyr culture even outside of religion groups.
As far the need to crack the books I'm not sure how much more the right needs to know. With guys like Dr. Kedar on the right it doesn't really seem like a complaint on the Israeli right but rather the Anglo - Jewish right. I would add that the Arabs are not cracking books, and so if you think that as the Nukhba terrorist storms your kibbutz you can save yourself by quoting Anwar Shaul or Shimon Ballas is silly.
1) Manipulative western thinking is good.
2) It's not remotely true that the average Israeli right winger interacts with Arabs on a daily basis.
3) Who really listens to Kedar? His plan is the Emirates thing. What effort has been put into that? I think he's just wheeled on as a token guy to prove the Right understands Arabs, but his actual ideas are basically ignored.
4) I think lefties understand the facts of the conflict a lot better than Zionists, but they are playing with a massive handicap by not understanding HBD.
1) it's good for manipulation of westerners, we are manipulating a very different people.
2) I'll concede but I meant really residents of Judea and Samaria.
3) he is more popular than ever, even if people don't go for the Emirates thing he's never had more eyes and ears on him. He is without a doubt a major influence. Dr. BenAri (whether you agree with his conclusions or not) published his last book which is just a history lesson on Arabs and Islam.
4) I don't think amassing literacy in obscure Arab/Israeli politics from the 1920’s makes there understanding superior and the center right in Israel has as many history autists as the left especially all the center left guys that have reluctantly joined the right post Oct 7. Basically every interview of an ex-general or Shabak commander on Arutz Tov. The handicap of not understanding HBD and Islam is exactly why the understanding of the left is lacking when compared to the right no matter how much knowledge they amass. When you are a western atheist you have a lot longer way to go to understanding Arabs than the right. Mizrachi anti-zionism WAS a relevant thing for example . Anyways how much info do I really need? Read a little Raphael Patai, maybe a once over of the Quaran and I think the average Joe probably gets the idea that peace doesn't have to be an option in the Islamic hand. It's very clear that over intellectualization of the conflict is a handicap on the left, the Arabs are quite aware of that and use it to manipulate the “PFLP LARPers in the west”.
1) The mindset is correct, but it requires accurate anthropology to work.
2) Also not true. People in Gush settlements probably know fewer Arabs than I do. You're talking about like 20,000 people maybe. And they also meet an unrepresentative group of Arabs.
3) I don't see it, but maybe I'm not clued in. I think Ben Ari is full of shit, but he is better than the rest.
4) Rightists also don't understand HBD, for obvious reasons. They try and approximate it through demonising Arabs. Maybe a few decades ago this was a reasonable approximation, but it's become ever more hysterical.
It reminds me of a joint PFLP Antifa protest I attended outside of Shaar Yaffo. The Arab youth and the antifa were kept sperate being managed by an Arab school teacher in the middle. I approached the shabab and told them the antifa Jews were all pro LGBT stuff and almost caused a mob on mob clash. The teacher started having to yell that I was lying and all the antifa guys were just /our Jews/ or something. When I tried the same shtick on the antifa guy he said the Arabs were just good commies, literally as the Arab teacher who had been giving a speech started an Allah Akbar chant. It's a farce.
Sure.
https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/uploads/2026/07/E_112_26.pdf
Hamas plans are well documented and uh, quite ambitious.
Thank you for having an unusually intelligent and high context conversation fan of you both
great discussion. look forward to more episodes.
The 38 helicopters were wrong, but not the other side.
And nothing has changed since then.
Ackerman's points about bloviating of Arab leaders usually being for their own rube domestic audiences rather than any reflection of their true undestanding of the world applies even more so to Iran. Ironically Israel spent most of the 1980s urging to the USA this "understanding" of Iran, i.e not to take their firebrand rhetoric seriously and rather see it as part of Iran's (failed) attempt to claim moral leadership in the Middle-East via the Palestine issues, among other things.
This gradually changed over the 1990s as continued hostility led to real Iranian actions in that sphere finally matching rhetoric.
I am inclined to agree with Non-Zionism's arguments about democracy in Egypt, given the total monkeys elected to government in Israel, I don't think it can really be overstated how much a danger Egypt could be to itself and the region if it were given "free, fair and open" elections.
Take off the hat, you know that shit is made up
Interesting you got this guy. I think even a post-colonial Stalinist like The Oriental Despot blog will be proud.
Out of interest, how come you have long peyos?
… I don’t?