Grim. I learned a lot about Jews and Israel from your writing. If, for whatever reason, you decide to leave or if you get kicked out again, I’ve got some space in the attic at my place.
lol the AI rav ovadiah convincing a secular/religious-lite sefaradi to vote ש״ס over ט with zero rational explanation besides “I said so” is definitely giving over weird vibes. What in the world is this ad? Wouldn’t it have been better to just put a video of ROY saying vote for Shas and that’s it?
Also, is this serious? Voting Shas is a segulah for parnassah? Whatever happened to placing politics as far as possible from religious significance??
A few cycles ago they had a viral election campaign with signs featuring the late Rav brandishing a Shas ticket saying “This is your ticket to Olam HaBa”. They toe the line so masterfully between amoral deplorability and blissful retardation bordering on childlike innoncence that one can only sit back in awe.
Very funny and mostly true. The sad part is that Bibi could have retired a few years ago with a slap in the wrist, become a respected elder statesman, give talks all over the world and make a lot of money. Another do nothing politician would have replaced him, hopefully somebody who would avoid breaking a working system as the Bibi of old.
Crazy how all western countries are getting themselves stuck in suboptimal equilibria just because all their respective Yair Golans have built their political identities around denying the evidence of their own eyes and purposefully failing at basic pattern recognition. Literally the story of Emmanuel Macron’s presidency in France.
I've read a couple of your pieces now and enjoyed them but i'm not sure what to think about Israel now. I was always sold the line that Israel was basically a western country like us here in Australia. Obviously they were majority and culturally Jewish instead of Christian but i always thought it would be more or less recognizible. Is that not the case? If Israel isn't western what is it?
> Third, [the Knesset] has the most pure form of proportional representation in the world (the Netherlands would be the only contender, but it has an upper house elected by local legislatures).
Our upper house is elected by the provincial legislators. But that undersells how proportional it is. Because the Senate gets elected by proportional representation, with the provincial legislators as voters. But with the votes of those legislators weighed according to how many people they represent in their provincial legislature. And those provincial legislatures themselves are all elected simultaneously according to proportional representation. So that the Senate composition just proportionally reflects the last provincial election result.
And when it comes to the lower House, there it is even more purely proportional than the Knesset since there is no literally no voting threshold beyond the ability to get at least one seat nationwide. All other nations that use "proportional" representation have at least a threshold or some sort of districts except for us and Namibia (lol). In no other country can you get into parliament with literally 0.84% of the national vote, like Bij1 did in 2021.
I need to rewrite this, but the threshold in Israel was 1% until 1988 (barely above the minimum needed to get one of 120 seats in any case). It was raised mostly to try and exclude the Arab parties, which didn't work.
Oh, and it’s not true what you wrote about thresholds. The Netherlands does have a threshold: 0.667%. If that wasn’t there, parties could get elected with roughly 0.35%. In South Africa, they have nationwide proportionality with 400 seats and no threshold. The effective threshold is not 0.25%. You have parties getting seats with less than that.
‘Because the Senate gets elected by proportional representation, with the provincial legislators as voters. But with the votes of those legislators weighed according to how many people they represent in their provincial legislature. And those provincial legislatures themselves are all elected simultaneously according to proportional representation.’ Much, much more importantly, the election is conducted with the whole country as one district. States-provincial do not elect their own representatives per province or even groupings of provinces, as was the case before the 1983.
You mention that Israel lacks a written constitution, as do only six other countries. The four I can think of—Saudi Arabia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand—are all monarchies.
I think we’re both partly right, but “written constitution” is doing more work here than it should.
Saudi Arabia has the “Basic Law of Governance,” but it isn’t called a constitution. It is explicitly subordinate both to royal authority (as you said) and to Sharia law. So it functions more like a foundational statute under an absolute monarchy than a binding constitution.
Canada does have written constitutional texts—the Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982, plus the Charter of Rights and Freedoms—but its constitutional order isn’t fully contained in a single codified document. It also includes judicially recognized constitutional principles and important unwritten conventions (like responsible government) that courts treat as part of the constitutional architecture. It is a constitutional system, but not “fully codified” in one place. JJ McCullough explains this well here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cG_-r3xHvzk.
Israel is different again. It has no single formal constitution, but it does have Basic Laws that the Supreme Court has often treated as having constitutional status. Israeli constitutional reasoning also draws on broader foundational sources: the Declaration of Independence, the “Jewish and democratic” character of the state, and a body of evolving constitutional conventions and jurisprudence. So it’s best described as a mixed or evolving constitutional system—constitutional norms exist and are enforced by courts, but they are not consolidated into one entrenched founding document.
I guess you're right about Saudi Arabia. I just saw it on Constitute.org, but I never really looked into it. Obviously it's not terribly relevant as an example.
Yes, Canada's constitutional order isn’t fully contained in a single codified document. Just like... every other country ever. All countries have unwritten constitution; some also have written ones. There might be gradations and varieties, but the nuances don't disqualify it from having a written constitution.
Now, to Israel. 'It has no single formal constitution' I don't know what a 'formal' constitution is. Written? The Basic Laws are written. Sure, they're not a single document - just like in Sweden, Italy, France (which includes the Declaration of Rights from the French Revolution as a separate constitutional law), Germany (which similarly cites some of the rights from the Weimar constitution), Finland until 1999, France under the 3rd Republic, also arguably Spain. 'Israeli constitutional reasoning also draws on broader foundational sources' as, again, does pretty much every country. In the US the Supreme Court can't draw on the text to say a state can't secede, because it doesn't say that - although the Articles of Confederation did. SCOTUS also draws on things like the Federalist Papers and I'm pretty sure the Declaration of Independence although I don't remember a concrete example. 'it does have Basic Laws that the Supreme Court has often treated as having constitutional status.' Exactly, though it's not 'often' which implies that there were times that it hasn't. Since 1993 at least, that has been the position of the Supreme Court and no-one has actively contradicted it. The new Basic Laws passed since have been premised on it. 'So it’s best described...' Sure, you can describe everything in nuance and grainy detail, though if we look at each descriptor you chose, none is unique. The bottom line for me is: I have no idea why Israel's Basic Law should not be described as its current written constitution, at least not without disqualifying some other constitutions as well.
I admit that when I said Canada lacks a written constitution, I was being misleading—if not outright wrong. What I had in mind was the idea that Canada lacks a fully codified constitution. Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncodified_constitution) lists Canada as one of five countries with a partially codified constitution, and Israel as one of three with a fully uncodified constitution. In retrospect, I did somewhat move the goalposts by shifting the discussion to whether Canada's constitution is contained in a single codified document. I also didn't realize how many other countries have constitutional systems spread across multiple documents.
Canada's constitutional order is nonetheless unusual in four respects:
It lacks a single primary constitutional document. Both the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Constitution Act, 1982 are foundational texts, and neither can really be understood without the other.
An ambiguous number of other laws possess constitutional force. Many statutes are considered constitutional in nature and can only be altered through constitutional amendment procedures. What's unusual is that the courts have never fully delineated exactly which laws belong in this category. Section 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 lists some constitutional documents, but Canadian constitutional practice has expanded beyond that list. As a result, there is no universally agreed-upon inventory of constitutional texts. JJ McCullough explains this well in the YouTube video which I linked previously. Wikipedia also maintains a lengthy list of such constitutional documents: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_constitutional_documents#Legislation_mentioned_in_section_52(2)
Unwritten norms are recognized by courts and given constitutional force. This goes beyond merely acknowledging that such conventions exist. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that underlying principles—such as federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and protection of minorities—form part of Canada's constitutional system. While many countries recognize unwritten constitutional norms, Canada is unusual in the extent to which its courts have explicitly identified and relied upon such principles in constitutional reasoning.
Important aspects of the system remain entirely unwritten. For example, the role and powers of the Prime Minister are nowhere defined in the written constitutional documents. The office is not even mentioned in the 1867 Act and appears only in passing in the 1982 Act. Yet the Prime Minister is arguably the most powerful political office in the country. Much of the practical operation of Canadian government therefore depends on conventions and understandings that exist outside the constitutional texts themselves.
By a "single formal constitution," I meant a single document explicitly intended to serve as a constitution and generally referred to as such. Similarly to Canada, important elements of Israel's governmental system are not fully explained within its written constitutional corpus.
Another oddity is that the Basic Laws were historically ambiguous in purpose. The Harari Resolution envisioned that Israel's future constitution would be enacted chapter by chapter as Basic Laws, but for decades there was substantial disagreement about whether the Basic Laws already possessed constitutional status or were merely ordinary legislation dealing with constitutional subjects. Many of the legislators who passed them did not believe they were creating a judicially enforceable constitution. Only with the constitutional revolution of the 1990s, led by Aharon Barak, did part of the Israeli government—the Supreme Court—assert that Israel possessed a constitution and that the Basic Laws formed part of it, though not the entirety of it.
A further unusual feature is that the Israeli Supreme Court uses the Basic Laws to invalidate ordinary legislation, even though the Basic Laws themselves were generally enacted by the same simple majorities as ordinary laws. Moreover, the Court has claimed the authority to strike down Basic Laws that violate Israel's broader, unwritten constitutional framework. To someone coming from a country like the United States, with a fully codified constitution, this seems quite strange.
In a typical fully codified system such as that of the United States, the written constitution is the supreme binding legal authority, while other documents primarily serve to illuminate and interpret it. This is the role played by sources such as the Declaration of Independence and the Federalist Papers in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Courts may consult those materials to better understand the Constitution's meaning, but they are not generally treated as independent sources of constitutional law. When confronting issues not explicitly addressed by the constitutional text—such as secession—the Court generally resolves them through inference and interpretation of the written constitution rather than by appealing to an independent unwritten constitutional framework.
UK, Cananda, and New Zealand are all democracies according to the political science definition. Having a constitutional monarchy with no power does not change that, as it doesn’t mean they are actually authoritarian. Their kings are essentially the same as the president in Israel- ceremonial heads of state.
I am aware. I should’ve specified I was talking about both absolute and constitutional monarchies. Or I could’ve written “all have monarchies” rather than “are all monarchies”.
Britain has a long tradition of rights and balance of powers so it is not necessary to have a written constitution. The United States needed a written constitution after the Revolution. The problem with Israel is that it copied Britain’s system without the political traditions and didn’t adopt a written constitution either.
Not related to the article here, but what do you think of Israel Shahak? Assuming you're already familiar with his works directly, his wikipedia article has a lot of rubbish slander.
I flicked through one of his books. To me it came off like reddit anti-Christianity: a lot of true facts, a lot of hostile framing, a lot of confusion and a lot of professed amazement and claims to reveal secrets about what are perfectly well known things. I do plan on reading it properly and doing a book review and perhaps I should expedite that.
Shahak was rather more nuanced than that, one of his repeated points was that the earlier Israeli right (perhaps inadvertently) were the ones that broke down the strict media censorship regime of early Israel under Mapai.
His later two books have an excellent survey of Israeli newspapers (in 1990 iirc) where makes similar points, though Haaretz has clearly degenerated since he wrote it.
Another point was his highlighting of how Jewish fundamentalism in Israel often impedes conventional imperialist goals due to its intransigence and reluctance to work with intermediaries and so forth, e.g. (excerpt): https://x.com/haravayin_hogh/status/2052543835172192714
A lot of his facts might come as obvious to an Jew/Israeli, but remain immensely valuable to outsiders in highlighting the centuries-long degradation of monotheism in Judaism, the totalitarian internal nature of European exilic Judaism, deep misperceptions of Jewish culture in the Anglosphere stemming from familiarity almost exclusively with post-Haskalah Jewry, and so forth. That it comes from a place of understanding of historical context and internal criticism rather than some cracked antisemite makes him a very important source imo.
"The State of Israel recognises the right of Israelis who have claims to property in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that was expropriated in the War of Independence, but rejects outright Palestinian claims on a vastly greater amount of property they lost in Israel during the same war. The Supreme Court enforces the law on this basis even though it’s basically impossible to justify on rational grounds."
I think this is not strictly accurate. My understanding is that the issue is with properties that were not formally expropriated by the Jordanian Custodian for Absentee Property, and not sold to a third party. For example, in the disputes in Sheikh Jarah, the Supreme Court ruled that while the said authority did not grant ownership of the properties to the current tenants, it did grant protected tenancy rights (which is almost like ownership and requires payment of only a symbolic amount of rent) which are the court found binding. So effectively, the Supreme court equalised both sides of the conflict u. At least in this instance the fight the international media reports about is largely over symbolic resistance (refusal to pay even a symbolic amount of rent) and , I suspect, grifting (as it has been reported that families have been convinced by the PA to reject any compromises that were offered לפנים משורת הדין ה after decades of litigation)
"The State of Israel recognises the right of Israelis who have claims to property in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that was expropriated in the War of Independence, but rejects outright Palestinian claims on a vastly greater amount of property they lost in Israel during the same war. The Supreme Court enforces the law on this basis even though it’s basically impossible to justify on rational grounds."
I think this is not strictly accurate. My understanding is that the issue is with properties that were not formally expropriated by the Jordanian Custodian for Absentee Property, and not sold to a third party. For example, in the disputes in Sheikh Jarah, the Supreme Court ruled that while the said authority did not grant ownership of the properties to the current tenants, it did grant protected tenancy rights (which is almost like ownership and requires payment of only a symbolic amount of rent) which are the court found binding. So effectively, the Supreme court equalised both sides of the conflict u. At least in this instance the fight the international media reports about is largely over symbolic resistance (refusal to pay even a symbolic amount of rent) and , I suspect, grifting (as it has been reported that families have been convinced by the PA to reject any compromises that were offered לפנים משורת הדין ה after decades of litigation)
It's principally because I think it's important there be as much daylight as possible between Judaism and Zionism as an insurance policy for if/when this thing flames out.
There’s something to that but also I think it’s a bad idea to arm the most fanatic elements of society who expressly renounce the supremacy of the state that would arm them in favor of their sectarian holy men (this has not been a boon for the Palestinians, Lebanese, Iranians, etc.).
He's written about it before though I don't remember where. Basically his argument boils down to Charedim (for all their numerous flaws) shouldn't have to give up the good aspects of their cultural isolation (low crime and basic decency of the laity) to be forced to mix the secular or pseudo-trad Arsim trash of Israeli society
Israel seems to have a similar division of power as India in this regard.
The Supreme Court has what it considers a “basic structure” doctrine wrt the constitution and can strike down laws that it believes impinge on this basic structure.
The judges also appoint themselves through a collegium system with minimal inputs from the executive.
When the parliament passed a constitutional amendment 10 years ago that would have increased legislative and executive representation in the committee that appoints judges, it was struck down by the SC.
It does seem to me that this is a feature of judiciary in Parliamentary democracies where the Parliament is not explicitly sovereign.
‘basic structure doctrines’ is an idea much in vogue among judiciaries generally , even if makes a mockery of constitutionalism. In Israel, it has only been used once so far. All other times a law was struck down it was because it conflicted with a Basic Law.
And judges have not been ‘appointing themselves’ in any meaningful sense since 2008. Since then the government has a veto.
The Supreme Court has what it considers a “basic structure” doctrine wrt the constitution and can strike down laws that it believes impinge on this basic structure.
This was made up in 73 because Indira Gandhi literally annihilated the constitution, with 38 th amendment made possible/legal for governor to roam around with machine gun and kill people and without getting tried. People just don't know how crazy it was.
The judges also appoint themselves through a collegium system with minimal inputs from the executive.
Another popular myth. That's not the case, Government actually intervenes and guides the process, sits on files of inconvenient judges and of course transfers as well. Then relatives and others are accommodated as well, I scratch your back and scratch mine.
The basic structure doctrine was officially introduced in 1973 for the Kesavanand Bharati case.
It had prior to that also made similar judgements as in Golkanath vs State of Punjab.
The 1973 ruling (ironically) may have been inspired by a concept introduced by the Pakistani Supreme Court in 1972.
The 38th amendment that you talk of was passed in 1975 after the declaration of emergency.
2. Not sure why it’s a myth. Sure the executive can indirectly influence selection as I am sure it does in Israel as well. It can also delay appointments or make transfers. But it doesn’t directly decide who gets on SC like in say the US.
But if it were as straightforward as you claim, the NJAC would have never been brought in or passed by the Parliament.
Golaknath (1967) was actually the correct reading of the Constitution, with the Court holding that the government of the day (through Parliament) could not amend Fundamental Rights. Laws contrary to Fundamental Rights were void ab initio. This reflects a genuinely civil-libertarian vision of democracy, with clear limits on executive and legislative power.
The idea of "basic features" actually goes back to Sajjan Singh (1965), in which the judiciary upheld Parliament's power to amend Fundamental Rights. However, interestingly, even while concurring with the majority, Justice J.R. Mudholkar wondered whether there were certain features so fundamental to the functioning of the Constitution that they could not be altered.
He famously asked:
"Is there a distinction between amending the Constitution and destroying its essential character?"
"Can a change in a basic feature of the Constitution really be regarded as a mere amendment?"
Justice Mudholkar was actually on both benches—Sajjan Singh (1965) and Golaknath (1967).
Golaknath caused the government to lose its marbles. Parliament responded by passing the 24th Constitutional Amendment, essentially to nullify the judgment and restore its amending power.
The institutional conflict came to a head in Kesavananda Bharati (1973), where the Court transformed and institutionalized Justice Mudholkar's idea of "basic features" into the Basic Structure doctrine through some creative constitutional reasoning. It was essentially a compromise between the institutions. By a razor-thin 7–6 majority, the Court held that Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights, but could not alter the basic structure of the Constitution.
But if the issue were as straightforward as you claim, the NJAC would never have been introduced or passed by Parliament.
The NJAC was proposed because the Collegium itself is an extra-constitutional body, widely criticized as opaque, insufficiently transparent, and unaccountable. The executive also wanted a greater role in judicial appointments.
One could argue that the Collegium is, prima facie, constitutionally questionable as well. It emerged through judicial interpretation rather than explicit constitutional text and expanded incrementally, often during periods when governments at the Centre were politically weak. Due in part to the Court's high public reputation relative to that of successive governments, the Collegium system gradually acquired legitimacy despite its unconventional origins.
>If they were smart instead of dumb, they would instead suggest a law allowing an exemption to anyone willing to sign the following statement: ‘as a believer in Orthodox Judaism, I follow the opinion of all the great Rabbis that any involvement in Zionism is a grave moral and halachic offense, and therefore I cannot serve in the Zionist army’. The Charedim would feel mighty embarrassed, but they’d have no choice but to go for it, and the Right Wing alliance would collapse, making it basically impossible for them to form a government ever again.
Could you elaborate on why would this cause the right wing alliance to collapse?
>The State of Israel recognises the right of Israelis who have claims to property in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that was expropriated in the War of Independence, but rejects outright Palestinian claims on a vastly greater amount of property they lost in Israel during the same war. The Supreme Court enforces the law on this basis even though it’s basically impossible to justify on rational grounds.
This is not so crazy to me. The State of Israel's judiciary recognizes Israeli law, not Jordanian law. So when Israel passes a law expropriating Palestinian property "abandoned" in 1948, the Israeli courts recognize the validity of that transfer. (It was a very unjust law to pass but generally speaking the Court's job is to enforce laws the Knesset passes ha ha I know but that's how it worked at the time and you can't just upshlug the entire property system 60 years later.) But when Jordan expropriated land from Jews or Israeli citizens in 1948, there's no reason for Israeli courts to recognize that. And when Israel ends up in possession of those territories in 1967, Israeli courts are faced with land that Israeli property records show is owned by Israelis that was stolen by a hostile government. Why wouldn't they restore it to the record owners?
On the first, because you can't have a zionist party as part of a right-zionist coalition based on hatred for liberal zionists on the grounds they aren't zionist enough. Presently, they are able to fudge the issue, so you need to take it away from them.
On the second, yes, they are applying the law as it is and basically ignoring the political context, precisely as the Right claims they don't do.
>On the first, because you can't have a zionist party as part of a right-zionist coalition based on hatred for liberal zionists on the grounds they aren't zionist enough. Presently, they are able to fudge the issue, so you need to take it away from them.
Unless I'm missing something this is essentially the situation now, though. The charedi parties are explicitly anti-Zionist, are constantly denigrating the state, and refuse to participate in its defense. All of the Likudniks and dati leumis know this but tolerate it because (i) they see charedim as authentic Judaism and (ii) the charedim aren't liberal or tolerant or peaceniks or anything gross they associate with the left.
Yes, you're missing a lot. Charedi propaganda is that they are contributing to the war effort through learning Torah. You or I would just treat that as a ridiculous, but large numbers of religious and even traditional Mizrahim buy into it to some extent (hence the compromise position that only the really dedicated learners should get an exemption). The supposed non-Zionism of Israeli charedim is a big joke, only bought into by the over-60s. The vast majority are hypocritical Zionists. Channel 14 puts a lot of effort into promoting Charedim as part of the patriotic block persecuted by the Kaplanists, and their propaganda is ridiculous, but luckily their audience are dumb. In short, the current right-wing alliance is viable because of lots of strategic ambiguity and lying. The smart move is to force the issue and make them say out loud the silent part (or renounce the silent part, which would mean a collapse of rabbinical authority).
By the way, Shas isn't even formally anti-zionist anymore. They literally joined the WZO.
No, I mean I knew all of these facts. I agree that in substance charedim are naturally aligned with the substance of right wing zionism and thus the professed anti-zionism has a certain "me thinks the lady doth protest too much" vibe to it but their anti-zionism is quite explicit. In other words to the extent they're acting hypocritically it's the extent to which their zionist actions don't match their anti-zionist words, not vice versa.
what is the point of writing anything if you are this funny
Grim. I learned a lot about Jews and Israel from your writing. If, for whatever reason, you decide to leave or if you get kicked out again, I’ve got some space in the attic at my place.
lol the AI rav ovadiah convincing a secular/religious-lite sefaradi to vote ש״ס over ט with zero rational explanation besides “I said so” is definitely giving over weird vibes. What in the world is this ad? Wouldn’t it have been better to just put a video of ROY saying vote for Shas and that’s it?
Also, is this serious? Voting Shas is a segulah for parnassah? Whatever happened to placing politics as far as possible from religious significance??
A few cycles ago they had a viral election campaign with signs featuring the late Rav brandishing a Shas ticket saying “This is your ticket to Olam HaBa”. They toe the line so masterfully between amoral deplorability and blissful retardation bordering on childlike innoncence that one can only sit back in awe.
Why can't any of the thousands of political פרשנים in the Hebrew media write like this? They would probably be shamed and hang, but still.
Like and share, buddy, like and share.
Very funny and mostly true. The sad part is that Bibi could have retired a few years ago with a slap in the wrist, become a respected elder statesman, give talks all over the world and make a lot of money. Another do nothing politician would have replaced him, hopefully somebody who would avoid breaking a working system as the Bibi of old.
Crazy how all western countries are getting themselves stuck in suboptimal equilibria just because all their respective Yair Golans have built their political identities around denying the evidence of their own eyes and purposefully failing at basic pattern recognition. Literally the story of Emmanuel Macron’s presidency in France.
Macron seems like a pure cynic to me.
I've read a couple of your pieces now and enjoyed them but i'm not sure what to think about Israel now. I was always sold the line that Israel was basically a western country like us here in Australia. Obviously they were majority and culturally Jewish instead of Christian but i always thought it would be more or less recognizible. Is that not the case? If Israel isn't western what is it?
It is western in some ways, levantine in others.
It is incredibly provincial.
> Third, [the Knesset] has the most pure form of proportional representation in the world (the Netherlands would be the only contender, but it has an upper house elected by local legislatures).
Our upper house is elected by the provincial legislators. But that undersells how proportional it is. Because the Senate gets elected by proportional representation, with the provincial legislators as voters. But with the votes of those legislators weighed according to how many people they represent in their provincial legislature. And those provincial legislatures themselves are all elected simultaneously according to proportional representation. So that the Senate composition just proportionally reflects the last provincial election result.
And when it comes to the lower House, there it is even more purely proportional than the Knesset since there is no literally no voting threshold beyond the ability to get at least one seat nationwide. All other nations that use "proportional" representation have at least a threshold or some sort of districts except for us and Namibia (lol). In no other country can you get into parliament with literally 0.84% of the national vote, like Bij1 did in 2021.
I need to rewrite this, but the threshold in Israel was 1% until 1988 (barely above the minimum needed to get one of 120 seats in any case). It was raised mostly to try and exclude the Arab parties, which didn't work.
Hence Joint List?
Correct
Oh, and it’s not true what you wrote about thresholds. The Netherlands does have a threshold: 0.667%. If that wasn’t there, parties could get elected with roughly 0.35%. In South Africa, they have nationwide proportionality with 400 seats and no threshold. The effective threshold is not 0.25%. You have parties getting seats with less than that.
‘Because the Senate gets elected by proportional representation, with the provincial legislators as voters. But with the votes of those legislators weighed according to how many people they represent in their provincial legislature. And those provincial legislatures themselves are all elected simultaneously according to proportional representation.’ Much, much more importantly, the election is conducted with the whole country as one district. States-provincial do not elect their own representatives per province or even groupings of provinces, as was the case before the 1983.
You mention that Israel lacks a written constitution, as do only six other countries. The four I can think of—Saudi Arabia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand—are all monarchies.
Actually, Saudi Arabia officially has a written constitution. The king could abrogate it at any moment, but that’s what they call it.
Canada has a written constitution, as does Israel.
I think we’re both partly right, but “written constitution” is doing more work here than it should.
Saudi Arabia has the “Basic Law of Governance,” but it isn’t called a constitution. It is explicitly subordinate both to royal authority (as you said) and to Sharia law. So it functions more like a foundational statute under an absolute monarchy than a binding constitution.
Canada does have written constitutional texts—the Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982, plus the Charter of Rights and Freedoms—but its constitutional order isn’t fully contained in a single codified document. It also includes judicially recognized constitutional principles and important unwritten conventions (like responsible government) that courts treat as part of the constitutional architecture. It is a constitutional system, but not “fully codified” in one place. JJ McCullough explains this well here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cG_-r3xHvzk.
Israel is different again. It has no single formal constitution, but it does have Basic Laws that the Supreme Court has often treated as having constitutional status. Israeli constitutional reasoning also draws on broader foundational sources: the Declaration of Independence, the “Jewish and democratic” character of the state, and a body of evolving constitutional conventions and jurisprudence. So it’s best described as a mixed or evolving constitutional system—constitutional norms exist and are enforced by courts, but they are not consolidated into one entrenched founding document.
I guess you're right about Saudi Arabia. I just saw it on Constitute.org, but I never really looked into it. Obviously it's not terribly relevant as an example.
Yes, Canada's constitutional order isn’t fully contained in a single codified document. Just like... every other country ever. All countries have unwritten constitution; some also have written ones. There might be gradations and varieties, but the nuances don't disqualify it from having a written constitution.
Now, to Israel. 'It has no single formal constitution' I don't know what a 'formal' constitution is. Written? The Basic Laws are written. Sure, they're not a single document - just like in Sweden, Italy, France (which includes the Declaration of Rights from the French Revolution as a separate constitutional law), Germany (which similarly cites some of the rights from the Weimar constitution), Finland until 1999, France under the 3rd Republic, also arguably Spain. 'Israeli constitutional reasoning also draws on broader foundational sources' as, again, does pretty much every country. In the US the Supreme Court can't draw on the text to say a state can't secede, because it doesn't say that - although the Articles of Confederation did. SCOTUS also draws on things like the Federalist Papers and I'm pretty sure the Declaration of Independence although I don't remember a concrete example. 'it does have Basic Laws that the Supreme Court has often treated as having constitutional status.' Exactly, though it's not 'often' which implies that there were times that it hasn't. Since 1993 at least, that has been the position of the Supreme Court and no-one has actively contradicted it. The new Basic Laws passed since have been premised on it. 'So it’s best described...' Sure, you can describe everything in nuance and grainy detail, though if we look at each descriptor you chose, none is unique. The bottom line for me is: I have no idea why Israel's Basic Law should not be described as its current written constitution, at least not without disqualifying some other constitutions as well.
I admit that when I said Canada lacks a written constitution, I was being misleading—if not outright wrong. What I had in mind was the idea that Canada lacks a fully codified constitution. Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncodified_constitution) lists Canada as one of five countries with a partially codified constitution, and Israel as one of three with a fully uncodified constitution. In retrospect, I did somewhat move the goalposts by shifting the discussion to whether Canada's constitution is contained in a single codified document. I also didn't realize how many other countries have constitutional systems spread across multiple documents.
Canada's constitutional order is nonetheless unusual in four respects:
It lacks a single primary constitutional document. Both the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Constitution Act, 1982 are foundational texts, and neither can really be understood without the other.
An ambiguous number of other laws possess constitutional force. Many statutes are considered constitutional in nature and can only be altered through constitutional amendment procedures. What's unusual is that the courts have never fully delineated exactly which laws belong in this category. Section 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 lists some constitutional documents, but Canadian constitutional practice has expanded beyond that list. As a result, there is no universally agreed-upon inventory of constitutional texts. JJ McCullough explains this well in the YouTube video which I linked previously. Wikipedia also maintains a lengthy list of such constitutional documents: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Canadian_constitutional_documents#Legislation_mentioned_in_section_52(2)
Unwritten norms are recognized by courts and given constitutional force. This goes beyond merely acknowledging that such conventions exist. The Supreme Court of Canada has held that underlying principles—such as federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and protection of minorities—form part of Canada's constitutional system. While many countries recognize unwritten constitutional norms, Canada is unusual in the extent to which its courts have explicitly identified and relied upon such principles in constitutional reasoning.
Important aspects of the system remain entirely unwritten. For example, the role and powers of the Prime Minister are nowhere defined in the written constitutional documents. The office is not even mentioned in the 1867 Act and appears only in passing in the 1982 Act. Yet the Prime Minister is arguably the most powerful political office in the country. Much of the practical operation of Canadian government therefore depends on conventions and understandings that exist outside the constitutional texts themselves.
By a "single formal constitution," I meant a single document explicitly intended to serve as a constitution and generally referred to as such. Similarly to Canada, important elements of Israel's governmental system are not fully explained within its written constitutional corpus.
Another oddity is that the Basic Laws were historically ambiguous in purpose. The Harari Resolution envisioned that Israel's future constitution would be enacted chapter by chapter as Basic Laws, but for decades there was substantial disagreement about whether the Basic Laws already possessed constitutional status or were merely ordinary legislation dealing with constitutional subjects. Many of the legislators who passed them did not believe they were creating a judicially enforceable constitution. Only with the constitutional revolution of the 1990s, led by Aharon Barak, did part of the Israeli government—the Supreme Court—assert that Israel possessed a constitution and that the Basic Laws formed part of it, though not the entirety of it.
A further unusual feature is that the Israeli Supreme Court uses the Basic Laws to invalidate ordinary legislation, even though the Basic Laws themselves were generally enacted by the same simple majorities as ordinary laws. Moreover, the Court has claimed the authority to strike down Basic Laws that violate Israel's broader, unwritten constitutional framework. To someone coming from a country like the United States, with a fully codified constitution, this seems quite strange.
In a typical fully codified system such as that of the United States, the written constitution is the supreme binding legal authority, while other documents primarily serve to illuminate and interpret it. This is the role played by sources such as the Declaration of Independence and the Federalist Papers in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Courts may consult those materials to better understand the Constitution's meaning, but they are not generally treated as independent sources of constitutional law. When confronting issues not explicitly addressed by the constitutional text—such as secession—the Court generally resolves them through inference and interpretation of the written constitution rather than by appealing to an independent unwritten constitutional framework.
UK, Cananda, and New Zealand are all democracies according to the political science definition. Having a constitutional monarchy with no power does not change that, as it doesn’t mean they are actually authoritarian. Their kings are essentially the same as the president in Israel- ceremonial heads of state.
I am aware. I should’ve specified I was talking about both absolute and constitutional monarchies. Or I could’ve written “all have monarchies” rather than “are all monarchies”.
Britain has a long tradition of rights and balance of powers so it is not necessary to have a written constitution. The United States needed a written constitution after the Revolution. The problem with Israel is that it copied Britain’s system without the political traditions and didn’t adopt a written constitution either.
Agreed
"Avoided third world immigration"
Operation Magic Carpet cough
Not related to the article here, but what do you think of Israel Shahak? Assuming you're already familiar with his works directly, his wikipedia article has a lot of rubbish slander.
I flicked through one of his books. To me it came off like reddit anti-Christianity: a lot of true facts, a lot of hostile framing, a lot of confusion and a lot of professed amazement and claims to reveal secrets about what are perfectly well known things. I do plan on reading it properly and doing a book review and perhaps I should expedite that.
Shahak was rather more nuanced than that, one of his repeated points was that the earlier Israeli right (perhaps inadvertently) were the ones that broke down the strict media censorship regime of early Israel under Mapai.
His later two books have an excellent survey of Israeli newspapers (in 1990 iirc) where makes similar points, though Haaretz has clearly degenerated since he wrote it.
Another point was his highlighting of how Jewish fundamentalism in Israel often impedes conventional imperialist goals due to its intransigence and reluctance to work with intermediaries and so forth, e.g. (excerpt): https://x.com/haravayin_hogh/status/2052543835172192714
https://x.com/haravayin_hogh/status/1819922924641701890
A lot of his facts might come as obvious to an Jew/Israeli, but remain immensely valuable to outsiders in highlighting the centuries-long degradation of monotheism in Judaism, the totalitarian internal nature of European exilic Judaism, deep misperceptions of Jewish culture in the Anglosphere stemming from familiarity almost exclusively with post-Haskalah Jewry, and so forth. That it comes from a place of understanding of historical context and internal criticism rather than some cracked antisemite makes him a very important source imo.
Anyway I'm curious to see an eventual review.
"The State of Israel recognises the right of Israelis who have claims to property in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that was expropriated in the War of Independence, but rejects outright Palestinian claims on a vastly greater amount of property they lost in Israel during the same war. The Supreme Court enforces the law on this basis even though it’s basically impossible to justify on rational grounds."
I think this is not strictly accurate. My understanding is that the issue is with properties that were not formally expropriated by the Jordanian Custodian for Absentee Property, and not sold to a third party. For example, in the disputes in Sheikh Jarah, the Supreme Court ruled that while the said authority did not grant ownership of the properties to the current tenants, it did grant protected tenancy rights (which is almost like ownership and requires payment of only a symbolic amount of rent) which are the court found binding. So effectively, the Supreme court equalised both sides of the conflict u. At least in this instance the fight the international media reports about is largely over symbolic resistance (refusal to pay even a symbolic amount of rent) and , I suspect, grifting (as it has been reported that families have been convinced by the PA to reject any compromises that were offered לפנים משורת הדין ה after decades of litigation)
I'll read up on it.
"The State of Israel recognises the right of Israelis who have claims to property in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that was expropriated in the War of Independence, but rejects outright Palestinian claims on a vastly greater amount of property they lost in Israel during the same war. The Supreme Court enforces the law on this basis even though it’s basically impossible to justify on rational grounds."
I think this is not strictly accurate. My understanding is that the issue is with properties that were not formally expropriated by the Jordanian Custodian for Absentee Property, and not sold to a third party. For example, in the disputes in Sheikh Jarah, the Supreme Court ruled that while the said authority did not grant ownership of the properties to the current tenants, it did grant protected tenancy rights (which is almost like ownership and requires payment of only a symbolic amount of rent) which are the court found binding. So effectively, the Supreme court equalised both sides of the conflict u. At least in this instance the fight the international media reports about is largely over symbolic resistance (refusal to pay even a symbolic amount of rent) and , I suspect, grifting (as it has been reported that families have been convinced by the PA to reject any compromises that were offered לפנים משורת הדין ה after decades of litigation)
>For my part, I think the draft exemption is mostly a good thing
I can't imagine why. For social-conservative/religious reasons? Maybe write a post on this.
It's principally because I think it's important there be as much daylight as possible between Judaism and Zionism as an insurance policy for if/when this thing flames out.
There’s something to that but also I think it’s a bad idea to arm the most fanatic elements of society who expressly renounce the supremacy of the state that would arm them in favor of their sectarian holy men (this has not been a boon for the Palestinians, Lebanese, Iranians, etc.).
He's written about it before though I don't remember where. Basically his argument boils down to Charedim (for all their numerous flaws) shouldn't have to give up the good aspects of their cultural isolation (low crime and basic decency of the laity) to be forced to mix the secular or pseudo-trad Arsim trash of Israeli society
But the hilomin do? (also it's not that bad they're pretty nice and fun guys)
Israel seems to have a similar division of power as India in this regard.
The Supreme Court has what it considers a “basic structure” doctrine wrt the constitution and can strike down laws that it believes impinge on this basic structure.
The judges also appoint themselves through a collegium system with minimal inputs from the executive.
When the parliament passed a constitutional amendment 10 years ago that would have increased legislative and executive representation in the committee that appoints judges, it was struck down by the SC.
It does seem to me that this is a feature of judiciary in Parliamentary democracies where the Parliament is not explicitly sovereign.
‘basic structure doctrines’ is an idea much in vogue among judiciaries generally , even if makes a mockery of constitutionalism. In Israel, it has only been used once so far. All other times a law was struck down it was because it conflicted with a Basic Law.
And judges have not been ‘appointing themselves’ in any meaningful sense since 2008. Since then the government has a veto.
The Supreme Court has what it considers a “basic structure” doctrine wrt the constitution and can strike down laws that it believes impinge on this basic structure.
This was made up in 73 because Indira Gandhi literally annihilated the constitution, with 38 th amendment made possible/legal for governor to roam around with machine gun and kill people and without getting tried. People just don't know how crazy it was.
The judges also appoint themselves through a collegium system with minimal inputs from the executive.
Another popular myth. That's not the case, Government actually intervenes and guides the process, sits on files of inconvenient judges and of course transfers as well. Then relatives and others are accommodated as well, I scratch your back and scratch mine.
1. You’re getting the chronology wrong.
The basic structure doctrine was officially introduced in 1973 for the Kesavanand Bharati case.
It had prior to that also made similar judgements as in Golkanath vs State of Punjab.
The 1973 ruling (ironically) may have been inspired by a concept introduced by the Pakistani Supreme Court in 1972.
The 38th amendment that you talk of was passed in 1975 after the declaration of emergency.
2. Not sure why it’s a myth. Sure the executive can indirectly influence selection as I am sure it does in Israel as well. It can also delay appointments or make transfers. But it doesn’t directly decide who gets on SC like in say the US.
But if it were as straightforward as you claim, the NJAC would have never been brought in or passed by the Parliament.
Golaknath (1967) was actually the correct reading of the Constitution, with the Court holding that the government of the day (through Parliament) could not amend Fundamental Rights. Laws contrary to Fundamental Rights were void ab initio. This reflects a genuinely civil-libertarian vision of democracy, with clear limits on executive and legislative power.
The idea of "basic features" actually goes back to Sajjan Singh (1965), in which the judiciary upheld Parliament's power to amend Fundamental Rights. However, interestingly, even while concurring with the majority, Justice J.R. Mudholkar wondered whether there were certain features so fundamental to the functioning of the Constitution that they could not be altered.
He famously asked:
"Is there a distinction between amending the Constitution and destroying its essential character?"
"Can a change in a basic feature of the Constitution really be regarded as a mere amendment?"
Justice Mudholkar was actually on both benches—Sajjan Singh (1965) and Golaknath (1967).
Golaknath caused the government to lose its marbles. Parliament responded by passing the 24th Constitutional Amendment, essentially to nullify the judgment and restore its amending power.
The institutional conflict came to a head in Kesavananda Bharati (1973), where the Court transformed and institutionalized Justice Mudholkar's idea of "basic features" into the Basic Structure doctrine through some creative constitutional reasoning. It was essentially a compromise between the institutions. By a razor-thin 7–6 majority, the Court held that Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights, but could not alter the basic structure of the Constitution.
But if the issue were as straightforward as you claim, the NJAC would never have been introduced or passed by Parliament.
The NJAC was proposed because the Collegium itself is an extra-constitutional body, widely criticized as opaque, insufficiently transparent, and unaccountable. The executive also wanted a greater role in judicial appointments.
One could argue that the Collegium is, prima facie, constitutionally questionable as well. It emerged through judicial interpretation rather than explicit constitutional text and expanded incrementally, often during periods when governments at the Centre were politically weak. Due in part to the Court's high public reputation relative to that of successive governments, the Collegium system gradually acquired legitimacy despite its unconventional origins.
>If they were smart instead of dumb, they would instead suggest a law allowing an exemption to anyone willing to sign the following statement: ‘as a believer in Orthodox Judaism, I follow the opinion of all the great Rabbis that any involvement in Zionism is a grave moral and halachic offense, and therefore I cannot serve in the Zionist army’. The Charedim would feel mighty embarrassed, but they’d have no choice but to go for it, and the Right Wing alliance would collapse, making it basically impossible for them to form a government ever again.
Could you elaborate on why would this cause the right wing alliance to collapse?
>The State of Israel recognises the right of Israelis who have claims to property in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that was expropriated in the War of Independence, but rejects outright Palestinian claims on a vastly greater amount of property they lost in Israel during the same war. The Supreme Court enforces the law on this basis even though it’s basically impossible to justify on rational grounds.
This is not so crazy to me. The State of Israel's judiciary recognizes Israeli law, not Jordanian law. So when Israel passes a law expropriating Palestinian property "abandoned" in 1948, the Israeli courts recognize the validity of that transfer. (It was a very unjust law to pass but generally speaking the Court's job is to enforce laws the Knesset passes ha ha I know but that's how it worked at the time and you can't just upshlug the entire property system 60 years later.) But when Jordan expropriated land from Jews or Israeli citizens in 1948, there's no reason for Israeli courts to recognize that. And when Israel ends up in possession of those territories in 1967, Israeli courts are faced with land that Israeli property records show is owned by Israelis that was stolen by a hostile government. Why wouldn't they restore it to the record owners?
On the first, because you can't have a zionist party as part of a right-zionist coalition based on hatred for liberal zionists on the grounds they aren't zionist enough. Presently, they are able to fudge the issue, so you need to take it away from them.
On the second, yes, they are applying the law as it is and basically ignoring the political context, precisely as the Right claims they don't do.
>On the first, because you can't have a zionist party as part of a right-zionist coalition based on hatred for liberal zionists on the grounds they aren't zionist enough. Presently, they are able to fudge the issue, so you need to take it away from them.
Unless I'm missing something this is essentially the situation now, though. The charedi parties are explicitly anti-Zionist, are constantly denigrating the state, and refuse to participate in its defense. All of the Likudniks and dati leumis know this but tolerate it because (i) they see charedim as authentic Judaism and (ii) the charedim aren't liberal or tolerant or peaceniks or anything gross they associate with the left.
Yes, you're missing a lot. Charedi propaganda is that they are contributing to the war effort through learning Torah. You or I would just treat that as a ridiculous, but large numbers of religious and even traditional Mizrahim buy into it to some extent (hence the compromise position that only the really dedicated learners should get an exemption). The supposed non-Zionism of Israeli charedim is a big joke, only bought into by the over-60s. The vast majority are hypocritical Zionists. Channel 14 puts a lot of effort into promoting Charedim as part of the patriotic block persecuted by the Kaplanists, and their propaganda is ridiculous, but luckily their audience are dumb. In short, the current right-wing alliance is viable because of lots of strategic ambiguity and lying. The smart move is to force the issue and make them say out loud the silent part (or renounce the silent part, which would mean a collapse of rabbinical authority).
By the way, Shas isn't even formally anti-zionist anymore. They literally joined the WZO.
No, I mean I knew all of these facts. I agree that in substance charedim are naturally aligned with the substance of right wing zionism and thus the professed anti-zionism has a certain "me thinks the lady doth protest too much" vibe to it but their anti-zionism is quite explicit. In other words to the extent they're acting hypocritically it's the extent to which their zionist actions don't match their anti-zionist words, not vice versa.
The second half of your comment is exactly what I was thinking