I appreciate your frankness on this issue. To be honest, Zionism is a topic that I very rarely talk about, since the ethnic politics of the Middle East are complicated, and I (some random American who spent a week in Israel and an afternoon in Palestine as a teenager) don't feel like I could say much about it fairly.
But I do know that America is trending left (i.e. toward the Palestinians) on this issue - I know my own generation and they are much less pro-Israel than their elders. Also I do agree that a country whose entire existence depends on a close alliance with the United States - even though the US is very far away and is supporting said country more because of ideology and inertia than because it shares a core interest - is in for a world of hurt. A few months ago I wrote a Substack article called "The Poland Paradox: How Faraway Allies Make Small Countries Less Safe." https://twilightpatriot.substack.com/p/the-poland-paradox
It's mostly about the situations in Eastern Europe and East Asia, and how the United States is making a winnable situation (the struggle by the various smaller democracies to contain Russia/China) less winnable by encouraging weakness and dependency among its putative allies - this, even though (as the Ukraine War shows) America's interest in getting directly involved if push comes to shove is very uncertain. But of course the same principle applies to Israel.
I wonder what would happen if Turkey rigged up a few hundred Bayraktar drones to fly low over the Mediterranean Sea on some dark, foggy night and drop naval mines in all of Israel's ports. If it happened today, the United States would do something awful to Turkey. But if it happened in 20 years?... (And Israel can't survive without its ports.)
At the end of the day, I support a Jewish homeland along organicist religious lines, I just want a centralized Jewish society where we can gradually refine ourselves into a more perfect form religiously and culturally. When it comes to Baruch’s ideas of RaHoWa, it seems increasingly fake and gay with each passing hour. Either a) we lose militarily and face an actual second holocaust, b) we survive in some form due to international intervention but become a despised pariah for years after, c) we somehow, against all odds, win militarily (likely with the help of some nuclear armaments. Great, what now? We’d be hated and feared, honestly for kind-of understandable reason, by everyone, forever. Spiritually the outcome would be even worse. I know life is the highest value, but we would embody on some level that which we hate in the Muslim world; a violent, sadistic and aggressive people, prone to disunity and civil violence. I just want an honorable peace that doesn’t involve us committing collective national suicide or having to practice cultural self-flagellation for a few decades. I don’t know what that would look like. Palestinian Nationalism is not secessionist, it is an extremely violent, irredentist, counter-nationalism which on some level believes that “suddenly for no reason whatsoever” Jews airdropped out of the sky in ‘47 and just acted maliciously because muh Jewish/Talmudic supremacy or whatever. The Arab and Muslim worlds looking out for them and wanting to advocate on their behalf is no issue, that is the normal and healthy course of action for your kin, I would do the same in their shoes. The problem is that this is neither a matter of giving them a few plots of land nor better living standards for Palestinian nationalists. I do believe we could enjoy some degree of sovereignty following such an agreement, even if it’s basically impossible, as we would settle into a tolerable lukewarm state of affairs with most of our neighbors, but the how is beyond me
"but we would embody on some level that which we hate in the Muslim world; a violent, sadistic and aggressive people, prone to disunity and civil violence."
Yes, that is their goal. 'This is the Middle East' as they are wont to say. But options (a) or (b) are more likely.
If I understand the argument correctly, you're saying there is no universe (on any time horizon?) that "the world" could tolerate the relocation of ~2-3M Arabs.
Putting aside for a moment whether that would be a right or good outcome, what's the basis for that claim? People are "displaced" all the time. 3.7M arabs were displaced from Syria, and no one cares. 4M people were displaced across the US border, and no one particularly cares about that either (except for people in the US). The "world" has gotten comfortable with the displacement of '48 (and the various expulsions of Jews and other religious minorities by Muslim and/or African countries). No one regrets the partition of the British Raj. It's a big world, and people move. It's not without costs (and those costs can vary considerably in severity), but "people moving" is not that remarkable in the big scheme of things (and it's surely less remarkable than "people killing and maiming each other in perpetuity").
My guess is that the actual impact on the world at-large of even ~3-4M arabs moving east and/or south is basically negligible. It could happen and, if there were no front page headlines, no one would even notice or care. That would include the overwhelming majority of the Arab world itself, whose actual day-to-day life would change not-a-whit.
The point is that perception is not everything, but in this case, it's nearly everything. It's very easy to maintain false beliefs when the actual consequences of those beliefs are attenuated, but it's also easy to change beliefs, when the actual consequences of those beliefs are attenuated.
That being the case, it's not hard to imagine a set of circumstances where "people" get comfortable with the idea of relocation. "10K and a bus-ticket--and peace and prosperity for everyone. Isn't it grand?" Egypt, Jordan and Saudi are "vassals" too, in their way, and while everyone says "they'd never accept it," somehow that's considered a more insurmountable obstacle to, y'know, convincing arabs to simply accept the mantle of jewish sovereignty and experience it, day in and day out. The consensus view that "I know there's a tried and true way of resolving these conflicts, but since 'the world' says 'they won't accept at this time' we're going to go with a 'solution' that we know will only perpetuate conflict based on all our experience" does not strike me as an enduring position. It's certainly not a terribly ethical or moral one, and yet it's the current consensus, which is hope in and of itself that a better consensus can emerge.
In general, you seem wildly over-indexed to a fairly recent (and relatively short-lived) consensus about the rights and wrongs of solving this conflict (and conflict more generally). The "two-state solution" was memed into existence, despite having little or no actual purchase or relevance to the conflict. The "palestinian cause" was too, and so was Israel (although the Israel meme mattered a lot to the people involved, which is presumably why it stuck). The consensus of people without skin-in-the-game is a relatively fleeting thing, I would think, and nothing like the forever-blocker you seem to suggest.
I support relocation of Arabs under peaceful and civilized conditions, as one component of a comprehensive settlement of the Palestine Question.
However, I disupte your characterisation that ‘non-one cares’ about displaced Syrians. Syria is a pariah state, under numerous sanctions, that has been attacked by America, and is left a puppet of Russia and Iran. If you are suggesting that as a model for Israel, I don’t think Iran is interested.
Please don’t take this as an insult, but I keep seeing Zionists saying ‘no-one cares’ about cases that evidently lots of people do care about. It seems by ‘no-one’ you mean vocal western leftists.
I gave other examples, but I actually meant the Arab world doesn't care. There's a particular status harm that comes with being displaced by Jews specifically, but displacement isn't something that seems to bother them much (or at least they are very willing to forgive and forget). In any event, Syria's pariah status is so complex as to be sui generis, and Assad still has many high friends in high places.
As for shrill westerm leftists, sure they care, but the lesson is that they can be safely and profitably ignored bc their concerns have no actual purchase with any relevant facts on the ground. They peddle tawdry rites and rituals (e.g. "unification of Jerusalem is a red line"), and when the juju is gone, they move on to something else. The action is the juice. It's theater. Their strength turns solely on how much attention and outrage we give them (which is why they excel at signal amplification), bc the reality is that they are a small number of high status, but ineffectual people with no actual skin in the game.
Please don't take this the wrong way, but I think "but what will the neighbors think?!" is a poor north star to navigate with. Do the right thing. Worry about the neighbors later. If you will it...
"I gave other examples, but I actually meant the Arab world doesn't care."
Where do you get your news? Syria was expelled from the Arab League for 12 years, and tens of thousands of foreign fighters were flooding in funded by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other Muslim countries. But, again, if you think Israel could 'get away with it' in the sense Syria 'got away with it', what does that mean? Which rogue state would be our patron like Iran is to Syria?
And let's say you were right, and it's only 'being displaced by Jews specifically' that makes Arabs kick off ... how does that change anything? What is your plan to make them not kick off? Bitch about how it's racist on substack?
'Do the right thing. Worry about the neighbors later.'
But if you do the right thing, your neighbours will declare war on you, and no-one will come to your aid. What this will cause is a economic doom loop in which the most productive citizens make for the exists, further crashing the economy etc.
But even if you think that it's possible to take on the world hypothetically, what is actually been done to make this feasible? We have had a 'fully right wing government' for 2 years. Which industries have been repatriated? What efforts have been made to make us self-sufficient in food or fuel? This is all a joke.
"you're saying there is no universe (on any time horizon?) that "the world" could tolerate the relocation of ~2-3M Arabs.....Putting aside for a moment whether that would be a right or good outcome, what's the basis for that claim?"
First of all, the author wrote this:
"Arab population of Gaza (2.1 million people) and Judea and Samaria (2.2 million people), the Shi’ite population of southern Lebanon (maybe 1 million people), and probably Arabs in Israel too (2.1 million people). "
That adds up to 7.4 million people.
One, you're asking whether the world would put up with the killing/explusion of 7.1 million people?
The million dollar question is, "what makes this conflict different from all other conflicts?" Where massacres and ethnic cleansing are the norm (see 1990s Balkans or Nagorno Karabakh last year).
South Korea would be a better comparison to Israel -- a US vassal, highly developed and integrated into the global economy, and neighbors with psychos.
And yet no one complains that there is a giant minefield DMZ between the two countries, and no one expects South Korea to provide free water, electricity, industrial development, and work permits to the North Koreans.
So which is it? Are Israelis too compliant (or "righteous", in your words)? Or is the Great Satan (oops, I mean Patron), the United States, too restrictive?
There must be many things Israel could do to raise the cost of Palestinian terrorism that the US would be largely indifferent to.
South Korea is not a good comparison to Israel because South Korea has good relations with most of its neighbours, is not doing a multi-decade occupation of people to whom it refuses to give citizenship, and does not have millions of descendants of expelled people at its borders who want to return. A better analogue to Israel is North Korea, a regional pariah backed up by one superpower (and no doubt there are fanatics in North Korea who want to tell China to pound sand too).
As to the other comparisons, America declared war on Serbia to stop ethnic cleansing and effectively changed its government, putting the old leader on trial and imprisoning him, so not sure what that is supposed to prove. In your Armenia-Azerbaijan analogy, again it’s Armenia that is the analogue to Israel, a country isolated in the region by religion and language, facing genocidal opponents with oil cash and forced to rely on foreign protectors. In truth, though, there are not really any good comparisons to Israel, because other countries in similar situations threw in the towel already.
Naro's question was ""what makes this conflict different from all other conflicts?" Where massacres and ethnic cleansing are the norm" and you answered verbosely, focusing on a side issue that he (or she) threw up as a dodge. Disproving the dodge doesn't answer the question.
In fact, you answered it: "Israel was created in the the middle of the Muslim world, against the objections of 100s of millions of people."
And that's it. That's it, Naro. There are a bunch of other differences, such as the nature of the Jews, the nature of Zionism, and blah blah blah blah, but at the end of the blah blah, this is what makes it different.
It's quite possible - indeed, probable -- that if Israel had been founded in some unimportant part of the Earth that no one gives a sh*t about this whole issue would be, as you put it, absolutely banal and similar to other conflicts and no one would give a sh*t about it.
But it wasn't. *SO DEAL WITH THAT.*
It was founded on land holy to three faiths, in a very strategic part of the world, against the wishes of the inhabitants, who are related by ties of blood, ethnicity, religion, etc., to the surrounding countries. And since it doesn't possess Vibranium, it must secure the patronage of a great power.
Does that suffice as an answer? Do you want me to elaborate. I won't. It's there.
1. Most people don’t understand how incredibly interconnected any advanced economy is, even at the size of the United States. At Israel’s size it can’t have a modern advanced army without being very connected to the rest of the world.
2. Your thinking is too conspiratorial. What exactly is the mechanism by which Bibi testifying about the Iraq war gets him back into power? And you mention the Mossad in relation to AIPAC, which is just silly.
2. I strike a balance between anthropomorphic thinking that discerns a conspiracy in all social phenomena and liberal counter-intuitivity bias which looks for any possible alternative to conspiracy as an explanation for anything. Or at least I try to; others will judge if I succeed.
2a. This seems easy to conceive. It's after the election, Sharon is picking a cabinet, his office gets a call from Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, etc. 'we really like this Bibi guy, give him a post and I'll do you a favour down the line'. It would be extraordinary if things like this didn't happen; they certainly happened in every other historical era.
2b. I wouldn't say Mossad has a direct relation to AIPAC. I would imagine any information that they do share would go through 4 or 5 intermediaries. What I believe is that Mossad knows as well as anyone who gets to pull which levers in the American government.
But there are thousands of these nudges happening all the time (in different directions). Bibi definitely has leveraged his connections in America on numerous occasions to attain and hold on to power.
I was thinking point 2 as well as I was reading it.
I feel in general US takes a very realist and capitalist foreign policy that protects and advances its economic interests.
Israeli has an incredibly reactionary foreign policy that is about extreme action to create deterrence. Saw quoted “what Hezbollah doesn’t understand through force it will understand through more force”
US gives money and support to Israel in exchange for the obvious things listed, but also for a seat at the table. A bribe if you will. When Macron was upset about Lebanon he did not get much say because he has not given enough material support. Won’t go into it but also see difference in handling of Ukraine and Taiwan.
In return most importantly US gets Israel not to take extreme actions. One possible response to the Houthi attacks was to have an intense bombing campaign. Israel did not do that I believe at US urging. My best, but limited understanding of why is that the Houthis have weapons that will reach the Saudi oil fields which would of course cause huge economic ripples.
3bn a year is cheap for US to get a seat at a table this important. The intersection of a super power that wants stability and a small nation that wants power projection is the give and take imo of the overall relationship
I like Hussein Aboubakr Mansour a lot. It's about the Middle East, generally, not Israel, but just as important for understanding our situation. Apart from that, I like Alex Stein for his interesting topics and information, and Haviv Rettig Gur is pleasant to listen to, but there are no really good thinkers I know of who take Israel as their topic. Apologetics squeezes out thought. I came to my conclusions more or less by myself by reflecting on things I learned many years ago from Unqualified Reservations and some other dissident right blogs + Benny Morris.
I’m friendly with all three and read what they write. But you’re in an entirely different league. What about in Hebrew? Any parshanim worth reading? I’m fascinated by Amos Kenan and wonder if he has any contemporary disciples.
Recently, I was having a conversation with two Israelis one of who is doing a postdoc in political science. I asked him to explain what he was researching and he got frustrated and then switched to English. He explained that since all the research he reads is in English, and all of his seminars etc. are in English, he doesn't know the words for a lot of stuff he writes about in Hebrew. Which is a preliminary to m ae saying that I don't think anything much interesting is written in Hebrew, even on the Right. The Kohelet guys write in English, even the Kahana guys write in English. In Hebrew, I think what you can find is mostly a meditations on Rav Kook or grunting (though others can correct me). The only area I know of where most of the good stuff is written in Hebrew is talmudic/rabbinic studies and on this score I would recommend Shulamit Elitzur, Barak Cohen, Uzi Liebner, Vered Noam, Adiel Schreimer (also publishes a lot in English), Yauir Furstenburg (also), David Henshke, and Menahem Kahana.
I would suppose the closest thing to followers of Amos Kenan today would be Vision magazine, but that's not very close.
I forgot to mention that Ben Koan's substack is good.
I've saved it in PDF and will read it and respond on my own little corner of Substack.
Just one thing. Writing:, "A political conversation with a normal intelligent person goes something like this: you present your case, he presents his, you bring relevant facts and arguments to support it, and, when these are pertinent, you acknowledge and adjust accordingly." is bizarrely reasonable given that the title of the article is: "Right Wing Zionism is retarded and cracked in the head."
What exactly do you mean by military Zionism? The book you linked seems to put it as something like "conquering the homeland by force of arms" as opposed to international politicking and appeals to the conscience of the International Community. I only briefly scanned it though.
Do the Labor Zionists from '48 onwards become de facto military Zionists because they embraced military conquest?
You've previously endorsed the "do-nothing-because-there-are-no-good-options" strategy. Is that not at odds with Cthulhu swimming left and inevitably dwindling foreign support? Sure, Cthulhu swims slowly and that gives us time. But time *to do what*? You say in politics all you need is time. Again, to do what? You say that inevitably dwindling support will lead, inevitably, to some desperate measure. What sort of measure? And if such a measure is indeed inevitable, is it not ultimately more prudent to pursue it from a position of relative strength?
(a) The term ‘military zionism’ is used in histories of the zionist movement to describe a particular version of Right-Wing zionism, and, in particular, to distinguish it from Revisionist Zionism. The reason why the term ‘military zionism’ is apt is because (a) this strain was based on achieving maximal territorial expansion by military means and (b) it emphasized the need for Jews to become warriors, not just as a means to an end, but an end in itself. But the term is not important, you could call it ‘rightoid zionism’ if you want, or ‘fascist zionism’ since the truth is that these people were basically our version of the Phalange, Ustasha or Iron Guard. But ‘military zionism’ is probably better as a relatively neutral epithet.
(b) The claim that the Labour Zionists became military zionists is one often made by historians like Ilan Pape. This is why they say stuff like transfer was ‘implicit in the DNA of Zionism’ and the like. There’s a kernel of truth in this, but it is mostly false. The ethos of Labour Zionism certainly changed, but a good way of summing it up would be the song שיר הרעות (the original nice version, not the modern behema version), acknowledging the need for battle, and the nobility of sacrifice, but yearning for a return to the fields.
(c) The short answer is that, in the time we have left, we need to make peace with the Arabs. Not all the Arabs (since they can’t manage that), but enough to be part of some credible regional alliance which means we won’t just be hung out to dry the second America gives us the heave-ho. It’s a hard ask, for sure, but we’re not even trying right now.
Israel obviously behaves like a satrapy, but the question is whether it's entirely too enthusiastic about it or not. Considering we are on borrowed time, and the US might get in bed with Arabist loons in the coming decades, what should we do?
I don't think killing a gorillion arabs is a path to sovereignty, but neither is leaving them any room for some UN supervised future statelet.
Could Israel not literally take a page from Bukele and solve Palestinian terrorism through mass incarceration?
Israel detained 5,000 Palestinians before the war, now maybe 10,000. Compare that to over 100,000 in Honduras, 10x higher. (Honduras and Gaza/West Bank have similar population size).
Ofc, Palestinian terrorists don't have face tattoos, but they're all known by name, face, and address to the Shabak.
We can start asking an easier question: why doesn't America just lock up all it's criminal gangs? Obviously, it's because of the Left and the Cathedral etc, but before you even get to that there's a more bedrock issue which we might call the 'my cousin Jamaal problem'. Basically, people in urban areas that are wrecked by crime are in principle happy to see criminals get put away, but they usually make an exception for friends or family members who 'just got caught up with a bad crowd', 'was gonna turn his life around', 'is working on his rap career' etc. Therefore, even though urban minorities are the chief beneficiaries of locking up thugs, locking up thugs is very unpopular with urban minorities and this is then exploited by the liberal media etc. etc.
The difference in El Salvador is that MS-13 got so out of control that people were happy even if their own brother got put away. Liberals would try to put out sob stories about some poor gang member who was just trying to feed his family and everyone was like 'f**k him, he can die'. It's one of the best examples of the 'sometimes you have to hit rock bottom' principle.
Now, the reality is that every time Israel arrests a Palestinian gang member, this is very unpopular with Palestinians. Really, they should thank Israel for removing violent thugs from their community, but because of decades of ethnic hatred, they feel the opposite, and one of the ways Hamas has gained popularity is getting prisoners released in hostage deals. So, the truth is that it would be great for someone to arrest every Hamas and Fatah member and shoot them dead, but Israel is not the country to do it, not unless the entire relationship changes.
One of the things I find strange about his argument is how on the one hand he will tell you how most Israelis are hummus heads, but then, also if we will it hard enough, we can expel all the Arabs and screw America etc. etc.
Even if that was possible, no one is on board with this plan. In Israel, everyone is onboard with the GAE intellectual and moral framework. There are a lot of things we can definitely "get away" with, but it doesn't even come to mind.
We don't have, say, the death penalty, or Singaporean law enforcement, because it's not enlightened. The Covid wasn't forced on us with threats of sanctions.
Yes, Gaza and Hizvala is in ruins and there are hundreds of thousands of displaced people, but it's not because we suddenly became "based" after 20 years of listening to the ramblings of Feiglin, it's just those retards left ZOG no choice but to crush them with their superior military force, and Israel's friends in the US can easily justify it without leaving the Overton window.
I think the simplest explanation is that Israel has been fighting a very long war, has used up a ton of ammunition, https://www.inn.co.il/news/650684 doesn't want to get bogged down in yet another a war in Lebanon and sees this as an optimal time to drill down on Gaza while replenishing their arsenal. So they agreed to a ceasefire as a temporary measure. It's too early to tell whether that's a decision which paid off, but it doesn't seem irrational for a sovereign state to try to limit the amount of fronts it's fighting on any given time.
"What they all have in common is that they have nothing to do with either (a) domestic Israeli politics or (b) the military realities in Lebanon. What they do have to do with is stuff happening abroad that Israeli politicians try to navigate as best they can, because that’s what you do when you’re not - because you can’t be - sovereign."
I don't think this is quite fair. Israel has gone it alone in the past (e.g. bombing the nuclear reactor in Iraq) when it felt it absolutely had to. And the settlements have long been a thorn in Israeli-American relations. Just because a country *also* responds to outside pressures doesn't make it a vassal state.
1) I don't buy this at all. Starting around 3 weeks before the ceasefire, there were increasing reports of French and American attempts to broker/pressure Israel into a ceasefire, and universal consensus among pro-Israel analysts that they must not give in. This all changed literally in a matter of 3 or 4 days. I don't think that this is because they realized they were low on ammunition (and if this was a factor it would make more sense to call a pause in Gaza). To reiterate my earlier points, this is a war the IDF has been planning for over a decade having repeatedly said the next war with Hizb'Allah will be the last, it was going extremely well, and the ceasefire deal essentially recreates the 2005 deal brokered after Israel was defeated.
2) I should read more about Osirak. I remember reading once that Israeli diplomats were secretly thanked by various embassies, immediately after condemning Israel in the UN so I don't think it was really the going-it-alone move it is often portrayed, but maybe that's not even true. I also don't know how it relates to the peace treaty with Egypt 2 years before, though it must in some way.
3) Baruch is a intelligent person who has read a lot, and also has real life experience in things that genuinely gives him interesting insights into different things. IRL he does a lot of cool things that I support and I had used to have enough respect for him that I once gave 1000 shekels to a struggling farmer friend of his purely on his recommendation. I wish he wouldn't conduct himself the way he does on social media/online and came to the conclusion that he would always just revert to doing so, but my intention is not to bait him. I have tried to ignore his insults and prods for the past 3 months and I shall go back to doing so for the time being.
"I remember reading once that Israeli diplomats were secretly thanked by various embassies, immediately after condemning Israel in the UN so I don't think it was really the going-it-alone move it is often portrayed, but maybe that's not even true."
"The world condemned Israel for attacking the nuclear reactor near Baghdad
On June 19, the UN Security Council unanimously condemned the attack, calling it a “clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.”
The US not only voted for the resolution, but to emphasize its displeasure, announced it was suspending the delivery of additional F-16s to the IAF.
At the time, the Reagan administration was trying to improve ties with Baghdad. It was therefore critical for the US to distance itself from Israel’s raid, stressing that no advanced notification had been received and denouncing the strike as “a source of utmost concern.’’
Washington’s adverse reaction was foreseen in Jerusalem and was a consideration for those in Israel’s security cabinet who argued against launching the attack."
I understand that this is the standard narrative and am not surprised to see JPost say it, I just think it's not the whole story. But, as I say, I don't know much about it, and I agree that per se Osirak is evidence in favour of Israel having relatively high freedom of action.
"and universal consensus among pro-Israel analysts that they must not give in."
I don't think there was universal consensus at all. Quite the contrary. (The last thing anyone needs is another dragged out occupation of Lebanon. That doesn't end well for Israel.) This is from November 17th. https://omny.fm/shows/koteret/cf7243b1-1d07-4c0d-9eb1-b22b01096944?in_playlist=podcast He makes quite clear that the IDF has accomplished what was realistically reasonable to accomplish.
At a Knesset session, on November 17th, Bibi said the following: https://www.gov.il/he/pages/event-40-181124 אנחנו מדברים כרגע על מו"מ אפשרי להסדרה. האמריקנים מובילים את זה. אני אומר - זה מתבצע רק תחת אש. הוא מתבצע עם הרבה מאוד אש. אנחנו דורשים את הרחקת החיזבאללה מעבר לליטני. אנחנו דורשים דרישות נוספות שלא אפרט כאן, אבל הדבר החשוב ביותר זה לא הנייר, גם אם יהיה נייר. הנייר, כבודו מונח במקומו, אבל אנחנו נידרש על מנת להבטיח את הביטחון בצפון בפעולה שיטתית לא רק נגד תקיפות של חיזבאללה שיכולות לבוא, גם אם תהיה הפסקת אש, אף אחד לא אומר שהיא תחזיק מעמד. אז זה לא רק התגובה שלנו, תגובה מונעת, תגובה בעקבות תקיפה, זה גם היכולת למנוע התעצמות של חיזבאללה, ועל כך אנו שוקדים ועמלים קודם כל על ידי פעולה שמונעת את ההתחמשות דרך סוריה. אנחנו פוגעים במעברי הגבול. אנחנו פוגעים במטרות בתוך סוריה. אנחנו, מנוי וגמור איתנו לא לאפשר לחיזבאללה לחזור למצב שהוא היה ב-6 באוקטובר, והוא כבר לא שם. אבל אנחנו רוצים לשמר את זה שהוא לא שם ולייצר מציאות ביטחונית שמאפשרת לתושבינו לחזור לבתיהם.
Again, I have no idea if Bibi made the right call. (In particular, I tend to take Avigdor Lieberman's reservations seriously.) My point is simply that it isn't obvious that there was some all out triumph in the offing which was then prevented by Henry Kissinger's ghost.
"I don't think that this is because they realized they were low on ammunition (and if this was a factor it would make more sense to call a pause in Gaza)."
They weren't going to stop the fighting in Gaza. One of the goals of the fighting in *Lebanon* was to force Hezbollah to stop insisting on a ceasefire in Gaza as a precondition for one in the North.
I also don't think there's actually much weaponry being used in Gaza. The IDF has pretty much full control of the place. Most of the fighting is essentially the same type of thing they do on a regular basis in Yehuda ve'shomron. They're pretty much spinning their wheels because they can't decide what to do there next, but that's got nothing to do with weapons and everything to do with internal Israeli politics about resettlement, the hostages etc.
1) I fully accept there is ammunition shortage, I just think it is unlikely that this played a role in the sudden agreement to a ceasefire, since this was a known fact before the Lebanon invasion started.
2) I agree with what you say about Gaza, but I think that undermines your earlier claim that Israel agreed to the ceasefire to get room to 'drill down' on Gaza.
3) I am not claiming an all out triumph was in the offing, I am saying that the war was going well, the casualty ratio was extremely lopsided, and each successive day harmed Hizb'Allah far more than Israel, which means that you would expect Hizb'Allah to be the one making concessions, when, in fact ,the ceasefire is essentially identical to the one from 2005 when Israel lost.
4) As far as I can tell, this goal of 'detaching' Hizb'Allah from the Gaza war was simply made up after the fact. The declared goal was to allow northern residents to return home. Judged by that, it can only be called 50% success and, again, the likely result of continuing the war for another month was greater success.
5) I agree with your last point that the Gaza war continues for reasons of (nonsense) domestic politics. I believe this proves my though. America's overriding goal is to prevent regional escalation and has allowed Israel to do more or less what it wants in Gaza (much to Israel's detriment IMO) while placing heavy restrictions on what it can do to Lebanon and Iran (also to its detriment). [Even if you are right that the ceasefire was a smart move to avoid a quagmire, it would still be a case of outside forces pressuring Israel since, plainly, our domestic politics are pro getting into quagmires.]
"I agree with what you say about Gaza, but I think that undermines your earlier claim that Israel agreed to the ceasefire to get room to 'drill down' on Gaza."
Sorry, I should have been clearer. My understanding of the situation in Gaza is that Hamas no longer functions as an army with orderly battalions etc. But they're very much still an armed group. What that means on the ground is that there's much fewer IDF soldiers needed to hold territory, and there aren't protracted battles on the ground. But there are still numerous pockets of armed fighters- especially in places where the IDF has avoided heavy bombings due to intel about hostages located there. And the drilling down I was reffering to are the pinpoint operations where the IDF goes into places like Jabaliya https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/12/02/the-idf-is-in-jabalia-again-but-this-time-there-is-nowhere-for-hamas-to-run/ to try to winnow out the remaining terrorists.
"As far as I can tell, this goal of 'detaching' Hizb'Allah from the Gaza war was simply made up after the fact."
No it wasn't. It was always looming in the background. This is from October 4th- I.e. the very beginning of the incursion: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-patience/ "To an extent, Hezbollah has fallen into a trap of its own making. It launched its “support front” a day after Hamas staged an unprecedented assault against Israeli communities and military positions around the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023. Hezbollah’s leaders have repeatedly stated that the organization will continue attacking Israel until the war in Gaza comes to an end. Therefore, it has been understood for months that only a ceasefire agreement in Gaza will lead to an end of the hostilities along the Lebanon-Israel border. The ceasefire remains elusive, however, and Israel’s patience with Hezbollah has run out."
"The declared goal was to allow northern residents to return home. Judged by that, it can only be called 50% success and, again, the likely result of continuing the war for another month was greater success."
I agree that they haven't been entirely successful in restoring safety. But I disagree that another month or 2 of fighting was going to change that.
"[Even if you are right that the ceasefire was a smart move to avoid a quagmire, it would still be a case of outside forces pressuring Israel since, plainly, our domestic politics are pro getting into quagmires.]"
I have to say I thought you (and some Charedim) were exaggerating in your assessment of the rightoid (Mizrahim) problem. Until I engaged with a guy on Baruch's blog who compared Charedim to cockroaches because they have the audacity of breeding and threw at them typical anti-semitic style tropes, even saying that he'd rather give money to the Arabs then to Charedim due to the threat of high breeding. At the same time he complained that the Charedim are not actively doing ethnic cleansing and called all his ancestors dhimmis. In other words, a full-fledged redneck ethno-nationalist with a zero-sum philosophy. And he considers this Judaism (evoking the milchamot theme)!
Had I taken you seriously I would have saved myself all that time.
One of the things I started worrying a lot about when I was still self-identifying as far right was the way that military Zionism was becoming popular among grassroots Israeli Charedim and acting as a conduit for the all the filth and degeneracy they had been successful in resisting for other sources. I worked at two different semi-noshrim yeshivas and saw a lot of this in action. I remember when I was at a Lehava rally in Yerushalayim (a spectator more or less) and seeing bochurim with giant chups mixing freely with arsim and their skank girlfriends and thinking this is not a good thing at all.
There is a story that Rav Shach was once asked whether the Satmar Rebbe had gone too far in one of his pronouncements and he said something like, yes, technically he does go too far, but if it wasn't for him we'd all be frei by now. I think that's probably correct. Pindrus is basically a Zionist and now so is Goldknopf. It's unlikely to end well.
I agree with you. I wrote a few months ago to a (good, ehrliche) DL guy who comments on Slifkin's blog that I think the shift to the right among Charedim is a problem. A few months before that I wrote a letter about it to a Charedi Baal Hashkafa (Rav Yakov Butchkovsky). This goes together with the fact that they don't seem to realize that their main contribution is not a magical idea of being a 'shevet levi' but rather the very real factor of continuing the old galus mentality of Judaism, in which the true strength of Judaism, that which stood us through thousands of years ככבש אחד בין שבעים זאבים is not military strength but rather the strength of כאשר יענו אותם כן ירבה וכן יפרוץ, and in today's world with headlines like these EU births drop to new low as strains on younger ... - Financial Times Peak population may be coming sooner than we think - Financial … it should be clear that this is the ultimate strength.
On your next paragraph: 1. This is another Charedi hashkafa which I see you got, which is that we can appreciate the need for Neturei Karta even if we strongly disagree with them. In this way Charedim are more openminded than the DL community. It is unfortunate that in some Charedi circles these ideas are misrepresented as almost an endorsement of Neturei Karta, but it is also unfortunate that some can't relate to this concept at all. 2. I think Charedi politicians are often the worst. I think Americans are better at recognizing that than Israelis. This has to do with the general problem which Charedim have with relating to the outside world, in which those who do relate with the outside world tend to be not the best and the brightest and have high personal ambitions (though all politicians have that problem).
Those figures are interesting, but they are calculated by subtracting OTDs from Baalei Teshuva and I'd like to see some more nitty gritty. Does some junky who becomes Breslev, goes to live in Yavniel and has 12 feral children now count as 'charedi'? I presume the answer is yes.
The more you write, the more I feel you are adopting the Charedi viewpoint.
I was going to comment that on your Bibi post, which was essentially the time-honored Charedi position on all such matters; there is no long-term solution in sight so let's just keep kicking the can down the road.
I think that my position is close to the classic Charedi non-extremist position, but obviously with a lot of elements that Charedim wouldn't except. As I like to say, Charedim are right about everything except Torah.
But seriously, I think even on the Torah issue you are moving closer to the Charedi position. You endorse daas Torah which is a charedi term.
And the more you adopt the Charedi position on social issues the more you must appreciate the wisdom of Charedi gedolim who came to these positions not through years of hocking with rightoids but through spending their life in Beis Medrash.
Additionally, the points where they are wrong on Torah are essentially the same points in which they are right on social issues. The Mesora and Daas Torah is not infallible and Hishtadlus does have a real effect. However, these hashkafos enable them to prioritize building communities and large families in a world which only values individuality and productivity.
However, I do believe Charedim have become somewhat a victim of their own success in that they attribute their phenomenal demographic success too much to irrationality. Reality will teach them. I just hope they don't take the wrong lessons (as you wrote in your other comment).
This is a minor quibble in the course of the essay, but in re the Sentinelese : it's not necessarily that it's their culture to kill outsiders, but rather that first contact with Europeans was disastrous (as for many Indigenous people). The last time I went on a Wikipedia wormhole about them, I came away with the impression that about a century ago they made the (rather prescient) judgement call that outsiders meant them harm, and have kept that memory. In the 80s(?) a group of anthropologists made progress toward contact, but governmental and organizational shit stymied the effort. Their ongoing isolation is as much a testament to the political situation in India as anything else.
That said, great essay :) It's stunning to me what a strange model of reality right-wing zionists seem to be working with. Just totally divorced from reality -- but then again, the illogic is a feature not a bug, as you pointed out.
While PostKahanism is the most articulate English-speaking representative of Rightoid Zionism, he isn't exactly representative. Most of them either (a) fall back on miraculous intervention to make the sums add up or (b) are just too baboonish to appreciate what the issues are. Baruch has gone out on a limb in trying to think through what the plan actually is and for that, I suppose, he should be given a certain degree of credit.
“I’m a little on the spectrum, so I can take a step back and, leaving piety behind, appreciate the spiritual power of this, objectively speaking. I’m not really frum in that way, perhaps any way”
If there was one thing i could teach my fellow frum people, it would be the ability to tactically deploy this kind of self awareness when necessary. Baalei T’shuvah naturally have an advantage in this regard (having lived on “both sides of the fence” if you will), but that’s no excuse for the rest of us.
I appreciate your frankness on this issue. To be honest, Zionism is a topic that I very rarely talk about, since the ethnic politics of the Middle East are complicated, and I (some random American who spent a week in Israel and an afternoon in Palestine as a teenager) don't feel like I could say much about it fairly.
But I do know that America is trending left (i.e. toward the Palestinians) on this issue - I know my own generation and they are much less pro-Israel than their elders. Also I do agree that a country whose entire existence depends on a close alliance with the United States - even though the US is very far away and is supporting said country more because of ideology and inertia than because it shares a core interest - is in for a world of hurt. A few months ago I wrote a Substack article called "The Poland Paradox: How Faraway Allies Make Small Countries Less Safe." https://twilightpatriot.substack.com/p/the-poland-paradox
It's mostly about the situations in Eastern Europe and East Asia, and how the United States is making a winnable situation (the struggle by the various smaller democracies to contain Russia/China) less winnable by encouraging weakness and dependency among its putative allies - this, even though (as the Ukraine War shows) America's interest in getting directly involved if push comes to shove is very uncertain. But of course the same principle applies to Israel.
I wonder what would happen if Turkey rigged up a few hundred Bayraktar drones to fly low over the Mediterranean Sea on some dark, foggy night and drop naval mines in all of Israel's ports. If it happened today, the United States would do something awful to Turkey. But if it happened in 20 years?... (And Israel can't survive without its ports.)
At the end of the day, I support a Jewish homeland along organicist religious lines, I just want a centralized Jewish society where we can gradually refine ourselves into a more perfect form religiously and culturally. When it comes to Baruch’s ideas of RaHoWa, it seems increasingly fake and gay with each passing hour. Either a) we lose militarily and face an actual second holocaust, b) we survive in some form due to international intervention but become a despised pariah for years after, c) we somehow, against all odds, win militarily (likely with the help of some nuclear armaments. Great, what now? We’d be hated and feared, honestly for kind-of understandable reason, by everyone, forever. Spiritually the outcome would be even worse. I know life is the highest value, but we would embody on some level that which we hate in the Muslim world; a violent, sadistic and aggressive people, prone to disunity and civil violence. I just want an honorable peace that doesn’t involve us committing collective national suicide or having to practice cultural self-flagellation for a few decades. I don’t know what that would look like. Palestinian Nationalism is not secessionist, it is an extremely violent, irredentist, counter-nationalism which on some level believes that “suddenly for no reason whatsoever” Jews airdropped out of the sky in ‘47 and just acted maliciously because muh Jewish/Talmudic supremacy or whatever. The Arab and Muslim worlds looking out for them and wanting to advocate on their behalf is no issue, that is the normal and healthy course of action for your kin, I would do the same in their shoes. The problem is that this is neither a matter of giving them a few plots of land nor better living standards for Palestinian nationalists. I do believe we could enjoy some degree of sovereignty following such an agreement, even if it’s basically impossible, as we would settle into a tolerable lukewarm state of affairs with most of our neighbors, but the how is beyond me
"but we would embody on some level that which we hate in the Muslim world; a violent, sadistic and aggressive people, prone to disunity and civil violence."
Yes, that is their goal. 'This is the Middle East' as they are wont to say. But options (a) or (b) are more likely.
May God in His infinite mercy guide us towards a better path
If I understand the argument correctly, you're saying there is no universe (on any time horizon?) that "the world" could tolerate the relocation of ~2-3M Arabs.
Putting aside for a moment whether that would be a right or good outcome, what's the basis for that claim? People are "displaced" all the time. 3.7M arabs were displaced from Syria, and no one cares. 4M people were displaced across the US border, and no one particularly cares about that either (except for people in the US). The "world" has gotten comfortable with the displacement of '48 (and the various expulsions of Jews and other religious minorities by Muslim and/or African countries). No one regrets the partition of the British Raj. It's a big world, and people move. It's not without costs (and those costs can vary considerably in severity), but "people moving" is not that remarkable in the big scheme of things (and it's surely less remarkable than "people killing and maiming each other in perpetuity").
My guess is that the actual impact on the world at-large of even ~3-4M arabs moving east and/or south is basically negligible. It could happen and, if there were no front page headlines, no one would even notice or care. That would include the overwhelming majority of the Arab world itself, whose actual day-to-day life would change not-a-whit.
The point is that perception is not everything, but in this case, it's nearly everything. It's very easy to maintain false beliefs when the actual consequences of those beliefs are attenuated, but it's also easy to change beliefs, when the actual consequences of those beliefs are attenuated.
That being the case, it's not hard to imagine a set of circumstances where "people" get comfortable with the idea of relocation. "10K and a bus-ticket--and peace and prosperity for everyone. Isn't it grand?" Egypt, Jordan and Saudi are "vassals" too, in their way, and while everyone says "they'd never accept it," somehow that's considered a more insurmountable obstacle to, y'know, convincing arabs to simply accept the mantle of jewish sovereignty and experience it, day in and day out. The consensus view that "I know there's a tried and true way of resolving these conflicts, but since 'the world' says 'they won't accept at this time' we're going to go with a 'solution' that we know will only perpetuate conflict based on all our experience" does not strike me as an enduring position. It's certainly not a terribly ethical or moral one, and yet it's the current consensus, which is hope in and of itself that a better consensus can emerge.
In general, you seem wildly over-indexed to a fairly recent (and relatively short-lived) consensus about the rights and wrongs of solving this conflict (and conflict more generally). The "two-state solution" was memed into existence, despite having little or no actual purchase or relevance to the conflict. The "palestinian cause" was too, and so was Israel (although the Israel meme mattered a lot to the people involved, which is presumably why it stuck). The consensus of people without skin-in-the-game is a relatively fleeting thing, I would think, and nothing like the forever-blocker you seem to suggest.
I support relocation of Arabs under peaceful and civilized conditions, as one component of a comprehensive settlement of the Palestine Question.
However, I disupte your characterisation that ‘non-one cares’ about displaced Syrians. Syria is a pariah state, under numerous sanctions, that has been attacked by America, and is left a puppet of Russia and Iran. If you are suggesting that as a model for Israel, I don’t think Iran is interested.
Please don’t take this as an insult, but I keep seeing Zionists saying ‘no-one cares’ about cases that evidently lots of people do care about. It seems by ‘no-one’ you mean vocal western leftists.
I gave other examples, but I actually meant the Arab world doesn't care. There's a particular status harm that comes with being displaced by Jews specifically, but displacement isn't something that seems to bother them much (or at least they are very willing to forgive and forget). In any event, Syria's pariah status is so complex as to be sui generis, and Assad still has many high friends in high places.
As for shrill westerm leftists, sure they care, but the lesson is that they can be safely and profitably ignored bc their concerns have no actual purchase with any relevant facts on the ground. They peddle tawdry rites and rituals (e.g. "unification of Jerusalem is a red line"), and when the juju is gone, they move on to something else. The action is the juice. It's theater. Their strength turns solely on how much attention and outrage we give them (which is why they excel at signal amplification), bc the reality is that they are a small number of high status, but ineffectual people with no actual skin in the game.
Please don't take this the wrong way, but I think "but what will the neighbors think?!" is a poor north star to navigate with. Do the right thing. Worry about the neighbors later. If you will it...
"I gave other examples, but I actually meant the Arab world doesn't care."
Where do you get your news? Syria was expelled from the Arab League for 12 years, and tens of thousands of foreign fighters were flooding in funded by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other Muslim countries. But, again, if you think Israel could 'get away with it' in the sense Syria 'got away with it', what does that mean? Which rogue state would be our patron like Iran is to Syria?
And let's say you were right, and it's only 'being displaced by Jews specifically' that makes Arabs kick off ... how does that change anything? What is your plan to make them not kick off? Bitch about how it's racist on substack?
'Do the right thing. Worry about the neighbors later.'
But if you do the right thing, your neighbours will declare war on you, and no-one will come to your aid. What this will cause is a economic doom loop in which the most productive citizens make for the exists, further crashing the economy etc.
But even if you think that it's possible to take on the world hypothetically, what is actually been done to make this feasible? We have had a 'fully right wing government' for 2 years. Which industries have been repatriated? What efforts have been made to make us self-sufficient in food or fuel? This is all a joke.
"you're saying there is no universe (on any time horizon?) that "the world" could tolerate the relocation of ~2-3M Arabs.....Putting aside for a moment whether that would be a right or good outcome, what's the basis for that claim?"
First of all, the author wrote this:
"Arab population of Gaza (2.1 million people) and Judea and Samaria (2.2 million people), the Shi’ite population of southern Lebanon (maybe 1 million people), and probably Arabs in Israel too (2.1 million people). "
That adds up to 7.4 million people.
One, you're asking whether the world would put up with the killing/explusion of 7.1 million people?
Second, are you on or off psych meds?
The million dollar question is, "what makes this conflict different from all other conflicts?" Where massacres and ethnic cleansing are the norm (see 1990s Balkans or Nagorno Karabakh last year).
South Korea would be a better comparison to Israel -- a US vassal, highly developed and integrated into the global economy, and neighbors with psychos.
And yet no one complains that there is a giant minefield DMZ between the two countries, and no one expects South Korea to provide free water, electricity, industrial development, and work permits to the North Koreans.
So which is it? Are Israelis too compliant (or "righteous", in your words)? Or is the Great Satan (oops, I mean Patron), the United States, too restrictive?
There must be many things Israel could do to raise the cost of Palestinian terrorism that the US would be largely indifferent to.
South Korea is not a good comparison to Israel because South Korea has good relations with most of its neighbours, is not doing a multi-decade occupation of people to whom it refuses to give citizenship, and does not have millions of descendants of expelled people at its borders who want to return. A better analogue to Israel is North Korea, a regional pariah backed up by one superpower (and no doubt there are fanatics in North Korea who want to tell China to pound sand too).
As to the other comparisons, America declared war on Serbia to stop ethnic cleansing and effectively changed its government, putting the old leader on trial and imprisoning him, so not sure what that is supposed to prove. In your Armenia-Azerbaijan analogy, again it’s Armenia that is the analogue to Israel, a country isolated in the region by religion and language, facing genocidal opponents with oil cash and forced to rely on foreign protectors. In truth, though, there are not really any good comparisons to Israel, because other countries in similar situations threw in the towel already.
Naro's question was ""what makes this conflict different from all other conflicts?" Where massacres and ethnic cleansing are the norm" and you answered verbosely, focusing on a side issue that he (or she) threw up as a dodge. Disproving the dodge doesn't answer the question.
In fact, you answered it: "Israel was created in the the middle of the Muslim world, against the objections of 100s of millions of people."
And that's it. That's it, Naro. There are a bunch of other differences, such as the nature of the Jews, the nature of Zionism, and blah blah blah blah, but at the end of the blah blah, this is what makes it different.
It's quite possible - indeed, probable -- that if Israel had been founded in some unimportant part of the Earth that no one gives a sh*t about this whole issue would be, as you put it, absolutely banal and similar to other conflicts and no one would give a sh*t about it.
But it wasn't. *SO DEAL WITH THAT.*
It was founded on land holy to three faiths, in a very strategic part of the world, against the wishes of the inhabitants, who are related by ties of blood, ethnicity, religion, etc., to the surrounding countries. And since it doesn't possess Vibranium, it must secure the patronage of a great power.
Does that suffice as an answer? Do you want me to elaborate. I won't. It's there.
DEAL WITH THAT.
1. Most people don’t understand how incredibly interconnected any advanced economy is, even at the size of the United States. At Israel’s size it can’t have a modern advanced army without being very connected to the rest of the world.
2. Your thinking is too conspiratorial. What exactly is the mechanism by which Bibi testifying about the Iraq war gets him back into power? And you mention the Mossad in relation to AIPAC, which is just silly.
1. Agree
2. I strike a balance between anthropomorphic thinking that discerns a conspiracy in all social phenomena and liberal counter-intuitivity bias which looks for any possible alternative to conspiracy as an explanation for anything. Or at least I try to; others will judge if I succeed.
2a. This seems easy to conceive. It's after the election, Sharon is picking a cabinet, his office gets a call from Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, etc. 'we really like this Bibi guy, give him a post and I'll do you a favour down the line'. It would be extraordinary if things like this didn't happen; they certainly happened in every other historical era.
2b. I wouldn't say Mossad has a direct relation to AIPAC. I would imagine any information that they do share would go through 4 or 5 intermediaries. What I believe is that Mossad knows as well as anyone who gets to pull which levers in the American government.
Ok both make sense. 2a is a nudge, I thought you meant that it’s also related to him becoming PM and staying PM.
But there are thousands of these nudges happening all the time (in different directions). Bibi definitely has leveraged his connections in America on numerous occasions to attain and hold on to power.
I was thinking point 2 as well as I was reading it.
I feel in general US takes a very realist and capitalist foreign policy that protects and advances its economic interests.
Israeli has an incredibly reactionary foreign policy that is about extreme action to create deterrence. Saw quoted “what Hezbollah doesn’t understand through force it will understand through more force”
US gives money and support to Israel in exchange for the obvious things listed, but also for a seat at the table. A bribe if you will. When Macron was upset about Lebanon he did not get much say because he has not given enough material support. Won’t go into it but also see difference in handling of Ukraine and Taiwan.
In return most importantly US gets Israel not to take extreme actions. One possible response to the Houthi attacks was to have an intense bombing campaign. Israel did not do that I believe at US urging. My best, but limited understanding of why is that the Houthis have weapons that will reach the Saudi oil fields which would of course cause huge economic ripples.
3bn a year is cheap for US to get a seat at a table this important. The intersection of a super power that wants stability and a small nation that wants power projection is the give and take imo of the overall relationship
You’re by far the most interesting voice on Israel I’ve come across. Who do you recommend?
I like Hussein Aboubakr Mansour a lot. It's about the Middle East, generally, not Israel, but just as important for understanding our situation. Apart from that, I like Alex Stein for his interesting topics and information, and Haviv Rettig Gur is pleasant to listen to, but there are no really good thinkers I know of who take Israel as their topic. Apologetics squeezes out thought. I came to my conclusions more or less by myself by reflecting on things I learned many years ago from Unqualified Reservations and some other dissident right blogs + Benny Morris.
I’m friendly with all three and read what they write. But you’re in an entirely different league. What about in Hebrew? Any parshanim worth reading? I’m fascinated by Amos Kenan and wonder if he has any contemporary disciples.
Recently, I was having a conversation with two Israelis one of who is doing a postdoc in political science. I asked him to explain what he was researching and he got frustrated and then switched to English. He explained that since all the research he reads is in English, and all of his seminars etc. are in English, he doesn't know the words for a lot of stuff he writes about in Hebrew. Which is a preliminary to m ae saying that I don't think anything much interesting is written in Hebrew, even on the Right. The Kohelet guys write in English, even the Kahana guys write in English. In Hebrew, I think what you can find is mostly a meditations on Rav Kook or grunting (though others can correct me). The only area I know of where most of the good stuff is written in Hebrew is talmudic/rabbinic studies and on this score I would recommend Shulamit Elitzur, Barak Cohen, Uzi Liebner, Vered Noam, Adiel Schreimer (also publishes a lot in English), Yauir Furstenburg (also), David Henshke, and Menahem Kahana.
I would suppose the closest thing to followers of Amos Kenan today would be Vision magazine, but that's not very close.
I forgot to mention that Ben Koan's substack is good.
A lot of excellent stuff in this poast.
I've saved it in PDF and will read it and respond on my own little corner of Substack.
Just one thing. Writing:, "A political conversation with a normal intelligent person goes something like this: you present your case, he presents his, you bring relevant facts and arguments to support it, and, when these are pertinent, you acknowledge and adjust accordingly." is bizarrely reasonable given that the title of the article is: "Right Wing Zionism is retarded and cracked in the head."
Well, I certainly wasn't expecting that, but thanks.
You're quite welcome. I still think the juxtaposition is, well, strange.
What exactly do you mean by military Zionism? The book you linked seems to put it as something like "conquering the homeland by force of arms" as opposed to international politicking and appeals to the conscience of the International Community. I only briefly scanned it though.
Do the Labor Zionists from '48 onwards become de facto military Zionists because they embraced military conquest?
You've previously endorsed the "do-nothing-because-there-are-no-good-options" strategy. Is that not at odds with Cthulhu swimming left and inevitably dwindling foreign support? Sure, Cthulhu swims slowly and that gives us time. But time *to do what*? You say in politics all you need is time. Again, to do what? You say that inevitably dwindling support will lead, inevitably, to some desperate measure. What sort of measure? And if such a measure is indeed inevitable, is it not ultimately more prudent to pursue it from a position of relative strength?
(a) The term ‘military zionism’ is used in histories of the zionist movement to describe a particular version of Right-Wing zionism, and, in particular, to distinguish it from Revisionist Zionism. The reason why the term ‘military zionism’ is apt is because (a) this strain was based on achieving maximal territorial expansion by military means and (b) it emphasized the need for Jews to become warriors, not just as a means to an end, but an end in itself. But the term is not important, you could call it ‘rightoid zionism’ if you want, or ‘fascist zionism’ since the truth is that these people were basically our version of the Phalange, Ustasha or Iron Guard. But ‘military zionism’ is probably better as a relatively neutral epithet.
(b) The claim that the Labour Zionists became military zionists is one often made by historians like Ilan Pape. This is why they say stuff like transfer was ‘implicit in the DNA of Zionism’ and the like. There’s a kernel of truth in this, but it is mostly false. The ethos of Labour Zionism certainly changed, but a good way of summing it up would be the song שיר הרעות (the original nice version, not the modern behema version), acknowledging the need for battle, and the nobility of sacrifice, but yearning for a return to the fields.
(c) The short answer is that, in the time we have left, we need to make peace with the Arabs. Not all the Arabs (since they can’t manage that), but enough to be part of some credible regional alliance which means we won’t just be hung out to dry the second America gives us the heave-ho. It’s a hard ask, for sure, but we’re not even trying right now.
Israel obviously behaves like a satrapy, but the question is whether it's entirely too enthusiastic about it or not. Considering we are on borrowed time, and the US might get in bed with Arabist loons in the coming decades, what should we do?
I don't think killing a gorillion arabs is a path to sovereignty, but neither is leaving them any room for some UN supervised future statelet.
Could Israel not literally take a page from Bukele and solve Palestinian terrorism through mass incarceration?
Israel detained 5,000 Palestinians before the war, now maybe 10,000. Compare that to over 100,000 in Honduras, 10x higher. (Honduras and Gaza/West Bank have similar population size).
Ofc, Palestinian terrorists don't have face tattoos, but they're all known by name, face, and address to the Shabak.
No crazy rightoids need be involved.
We can start asking an easier question: why doesn't America just lock up all it's criminal gangs? Obviously, it's because of the Left and the Cathedral etc, but before you even get to that there's a more bedrock issue which we might call the 'my cousin Jamaal problem'. Basically, people in urban areas that are wrecked by crime are in principle happy to see criminals get put away, but they usually make an exception for friends or family members who 'just got caught up with a bad crowd', 'was gonna turn his life around', 'is working on his rap career' etc. Therefore, even though urban minorities are the chief beneficiaries of locking up thugs, locking up thugs is very unpopular with urban minorities and this is then exploited by the liberal media etc. etc.
The difference in El Salvador is that MS-13 got so out of control that people were happy even if their own brother got put away. Liberals would try to put out sob stories about some poor gang member who was just trying to feed his family and everyone was like 'f**k him, he can die'. It's one of the best examples of the 'sometimes you have to hit rock bottom' principle.
Now, the reality is that every time Israel arrests a Palestinian gang member, this is very unpopular with Palestinians. Really, they should thank Israel for removing violent thugs from their community, but because of decades of ethnic hatred, they feel the opposite, and one of the ways Hamas has gained popularity is getting prisoners released in hostage deals. So, the truth is that it would be great for someone to arrest every Hamas and Fatah member and shoot them dead, but Israel is not the country to do it, not unless the entire relationship changes.
Shkoyech for taking the time to write this.
One of the things I find strange about his argument is how on the one hand he will tell you how most Israelis are hummus heads, but then, also if we will it hard enough, we can expel all the Arabs and screw America etc. etc.
Even if that was possible, no one is on board with this plan. In Israel, everyone is onboard with the GAE intellectual and moral framework. There are a lot of things we can definitely "get away" with, but it doesn't even come to mind.
We don't have, say, the death penalty, or Singaporean law enforcement, because it's not enlightened. The Covid wasn't forced on us with threats of sanctions.
Yes, Gaza and Hizvala is in ruins and there are hundreds of thousands of displaced people, but it's not because we suddenly became "based" after 20 years of listening to the ramblings of Feiglin, it's just those retards left ZOG no choice but to crush them with their superior military force, and Israel's friends in the US can easily justify it without leaving the Overton window.
"Feel free to spitball some other ideas."
I think the simplest explanation is that Israel has been fighting a very long war, has used up a ton of ammunition, https://www.inn.co.il/news/650684 doesn't want to get bogged down in yet another a war in Lebanon and sees this as an optimal time to drill down on Gaza while replenishing their arsenal. So they agreed to a ceasefire as a temporary measure. It's too early to tell whether that's a decision which paid off, but it doesn't seem irrational for a sovereign state to try to limit the amount of fronts it's fighting on any given time.
"What they all have in common is that they have nothing to do with either (a) domestic Israeli politics or (b) the military realities in Lebanon. What they do have to do with is stuff happening abroad that Israeli politicians try to navigate as best they can, because that’s what you do when you’re not - because you can’t be - sovereign."
I don't think this is quite fair. Israel has gone it alone in the past (e.g. bombing the nuclear reactor in Iraq) when it felt it absolutely had to. And the settlements have long been a thorn in Israeli-American relations. Just because a country *also* responds to outside pressures doesn't make it a vassal state.
===
By the way, I had my own little run-in with Baruch a few months ago. https://postkahanism.substack.com/p/unexpected-whitepills/comment/60234970 I kind of enjoyed it, though I can't say it was terribly productive on either of our ends.
In order:
1) I don't buy this at all. Starting around 3 weeks before the ceasefire, there were increasing reports of French and American attempts to broker/pressure Israel into a ceasefire, and universal consensus among pro-Israel analysts that they must not give in. This all changed literally in a matter of 3 or 4 days. I don't think that this is because they realized they were low on ammunition (and if this was a factor it would make more sense to call a pause in Gaza). To reiterate my earlier points, this is a war the IDF has been planning for over a decade having repeatedly said the next war with Hizb'Allah will be the last, it was going extremely well, and the ceasefire deal essentially recreates the 2005 deal brokered after Israel was defeated.
2) I should read more about Osirak. I remember reading once that Israeli diplomats were secretly thanked by various embassies, immediately after condemning Israel in the UN so I don't think it was really the going-it-alone move it is often portrayed, but maybe that's not even true. I also don't know how it relates to the peace treaty with Egypt 2 years before, though it must in some way.
3) Baruch is a intelligent person who has read a lot, and also has real life experience in things that genuinely gives him interesting insights into different things. IRL he does a lot of cool things that I support and I had used to have enough respect for him that I once gave 1000 shekels to a struggling farmer friend of his purely on his recommendation. I wish he wouldn't conduct himself the way he does on social media/online and came to the conclusion that he would always just revert to doing so, but my intention is not to bait him. I have tried to ignore his insults and prods for the past 3 months and I shall go back to doing so for the time being.
"I remember reading once that Israeli diplomats were secretly thanked by various embassies, immediately after condemning Israel in the UN so I don't think it was really the going-it-alone move it is often portrayed, but maybe that's not even true."
From here:
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-744137
"The world condemned Israel for attacking the nuclear reactor near Baghdad
On June 19, the UN Security Council unanimously condemned the attack, calling it a “clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct.”
The US not only voted for the resolution, but to emphasize its displeasure, announced it was suspending the delivery of additional F-16s to the IAF.
At the time, the Reagan administration was trying to improve ties with Baghdad. It was therefore critical for the US to distance itself from Israel’s raid, stressing that no advanced notification had been received and denouncing the strike as “a source of utmost concern.’’
Washington’s adverse reaction was foreseen in Jerusalem and was a consideration for those in Israel’s security cabinet who argued against launching the attack."
I understand that this is the standard narrative and am not surprised to see JPost say it, I just think it's not the whole story. But, as I say, I don't know much about it, and I agree that per se Osirak is evidence in favour of Israel having relatively high freedom of action.
"and universal consensus among pro-Israel analysts that they must not give in."
I don't think there was universal consensus at all. Quite the contrary. (The last thing anyone needs is another dragged out occupation of Lebanon. That doesn't end well for Israel.) This is from November 17th. https://omny.fm/shows/koteret/cf7243b1-1d07-4c0d-9eb1-b22b01096944?in_playlist=podcast He makes quite clear that the IDF has accomplished what was realistically reasonable to accomplish.
At a Knesset session, on November 17th, Bibi said the following: https://www.gov.il/he/pages/event-40-181124 אנחנו מדברים כרגע על מו"מ אפשרי להסדרה. האמריקנים מובילים את זה. אני אומר - זה מתבצע רק תחת אש. הוא מתבצע עם הרבה מאוד אש. אנחנו דורשים את הרחקת החיזבאללה מעבר לליטני. אנחנו דורשים דרישות נוספות שלא אפרט כאן, אבל הדבר החשוב ביותר זה לא הנייר, גם אם יהיה נייר. הנייר, כבודו מונח במקומו, אבל אנחנו נידרש על מנת להבטיח את הביטחון בצפון בפעולה שיטתית לא רק נגד תקיפות של חיזבאללה שיכולות לבוא, גם אם תהיה הפסקת אש, אף אחד לא אומר שהיא תחזיק מעמד. אז זה לא רק התגובה שלנו, תגובה מונעת, תגובה בעקבות תקיפה, זה גם היכולת למנוע התעצמות של חיזבאללה, ועל כך אנו שוקדים ועמלים קודם כל על ידי פעולה שמונעת את ההתחמשות דרך סוריה. אנחנו פוגעים במעברי הגבול. אנחנו פוגעים במטרות בתוך סוריה. אנחנו, מנוי וגמור איתנו לא לאפשר לחיזבאללה לחזור למצב שהוא היה ב-6 באוקטובר, והוא כבר לא שם. אבל אנחנו רוצים לשמר את זה שהוא לא שם ולייצר מציאות ביטחונית שמאפשרת לתושבינו לחזור לבתיהם.
Again, I have no idea if Bibi made the right call. (In particular, I tend to take Avigdor Lieberman's reservations seriously.) My point is simply that it isn't obvious that there was some all out triumph in the offing which was then prevented by Henry Kissinger's ghost.
"I don't think that this is because they realized they were low on ammunition (and if this was a factor it would make more sense to call a pause in Gaza)."
There most certainly is a shortage of ammunition. There has been for a while. It's a global supply issue. https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra14154773
They weren't going to stop the fighting in Gaza. One of the goals of the fighting in *Lebanon* was to force Hezbollah to stop insisting on a ceasefire in Gaza as a precondition for one in the North.
I also don't think there's actually much weaponry being used in Gaza. The IDF has pretty much full control of the place. Most of the fighting is essentially the same type of thing they do on a regular basis in Yehuda ve'shomron. They're pretty much spinning their wheels because they can't decide what to do there next, but that's got nothing to do with weapons and everything to do with internal Israeli politics about resettlement, the hostages etc.
1) I fully accept there is ammunition shortage, I just think it is unlikely that this played a role in the sudden agreement to a ceasefire, since this was a known fact before the Lebanon invasion started.
2) I agree with what you say about Gaza, but I think that undermines your earlier claim that Israel agreed to the ceasefire to get room to 'drill down' on Gaza.
3) I am not claiming an all out triumph was in the offing, I am saying that the war was going well, the casualty ratio was extremely lopsided, and each successive day harmed Hizb'Allah far more than Israel, which means that you would expect Hizb'Allah to be the one making concessions, when, in fact ,the ceasefire is essentially identical to the one from 2005 when Israel lost.
4) As far as I can tell, this goal of 'detaching' Hizb'Allah from the Gaza war was simply made up after the fact. The declared goal was to allow northern residents to return home. Judged by that, it can only be called 50% success and, again, the likely result of continuing the war for another month was greater success.
5) I agree with your last point that the Gaza war continues for reasons of (nonsense) domestic politics. I believe this proves my though. America's overriding goal is to prevent regional escalation and has allowed Israel to do more or less what it wants in Gaza (much to Israel's detriment IMO) while placing heavy restrictions on what it can do to Lebanon and Iran (also to its detriment). [Even if you are right that the ceasefire was a smart move to avoid a quagmire, it would still be a case of outside forces pressuring Israel since, plainly, our domestic politics are pro getting into quagmires.]
"I agree with what you say about Gaza, but I think that undermines your earlier claim that Israel agreed to the ceasefire to get room to 'drill down' on Gaza."
Sorry, I should have been clearer. My understanding of the situation in Gaza is that Hamas no longer functions as an army with orderly battalions etc. But they're very much still an armed group. What that means on the ground is that there's much fewer IDF soldiers needed to hold territory, and there aren't protracted battles on the ground. But there are still numerous pockets of armed fighters- especially in places where the IDF has avoided heavy bombings due to intel about hostages located there. And the drilling down I was reffering to are the pinpoint operations where the IDF goes into places like Jabaliya https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/12/02/the-idf-is-in-jabalia-again-but-this-time-there-is-nowhere-for-hamas-to-run/ to try to winnow out the remaining terrorists.
"As far as I can tell, this goal of 'detaching' Hizb'Allah from the Gaza war was simply made up after the fact."
No it wasn't. It was always looming in the background. This is from October 4th- I.e. the very beginning of the incursion: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/israel-lebanon-hezbollah-patience/ "To an extent, Hezbollah has fallen into a trap of its own making. It launched its “support front” a day after Hamas staged an unprecedented assault against Israeli communities and military positions around the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023. Hezbollah’s leaders have repeatedly stated that the organization will continue attacking Israel until the war in Gaza comes to an end. Therefore, it has been understood for months that only a ceasefire agreement in Gaza will lead to an end of the hostilities along the Lebanon-Israel border. The ceasefire remains elusive, however, and Israel’s patience with Hezbollah has run out."
"The declared goal was to allow northern residents to return home. Judged by that, it can only be called 50% success and, again, the likely result of continuing the war for another month was greater success."
I agree that they haven't been entirely successful in restoring safety. But I disagree that another month or 2 of fighting was going to change that.
"[Even if you are right that the ceasefire was a smart move to avoid a quagmire, it would still be a case of outside forces pressuring Israel since, plainly, our domestic politics are pro getting into quagmires.]"
Just to be clear, I agree that Israel is susceptible to American pressure. I just reject the idea that that implies Israel is some sort of vassal state. When it comes down to it, the Israelis will choose their own actions even if it means ticking off the Americans. https://www.axios.com/2024/05/09/israel-biden-rafah-netenyahu-response It seems nutty to me to think that Israel does everything the US wants. Decades of US presidents complaining about Israeli settlements did nothing to stop them. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2016/10/31/how-barack-obama-failed-to-stop-israeli-settlements
I have to say I thought you (and some Charedim) were exaggerating in your assessment of the rightoid (Mizrahim) problem. Until I engaged with a guy on Baruch's blog who compared Charedim to cockroaches because they have the audacity of breeding and threw at them typical anti-semitic style tropes, even saying that he'd rather give money to the Arabs then to Charedim due to the threat of high breeding. At the same time he complained that the Charedim are not actively doing ethnic cleansing and called all his ancestors dhimmis. In other words, a full-fledged redneck ethno-nationalist with a zero-sum philosophy. And he considers this Judaism (evoking the milchamot theme)!
Had I taken you seriously I would have saved myself all that time.
One of the things I started worrying a lot about when I was still self-identifying as far right was the way that military Zionism was becoming popular among grassroots Israeli Charedim and acting as a conduit for the all the filth and degeneracy they had been successful in resisting for other sources. I worked at two different semi-noshrim yeshivas and saw a lot of this in action. I remember when I was at a Lehava rally in Yerushalayim (a spectator more or less) and seeing bochurim with giant chups mixing freely with arsim and their skank girlfriends and thinking this is not a good thing at all.
There is a story that Rav Shach was once asked whether the Satmar Rebbe had gone too far in one of his pronouncements and he said something like, yes, technically he does go too far, but if it wasn't for him we'd all be frei by now. I think that's probably correct. Pindrus is basically a Zionist and now so is Goldknopf. It's unlikely to end well.
I agree with you. I wrote a few months ago to a (good, ehrliche) DL guy who comments on Slifkin's blog that I think the shift to the right among Charedim is a problem. A few months before that I wrote a letter about it to a Charedi Baal Hashkafa (Rav Yakov Butchkovsky). This goes together with the fact that they don't seem to realize that their main contribution is not a magical idea of being a 'shevet levi' but rather the very real factor of continuing the old galus mentality of Judaism, in which the true strength of Judaism, that which stood us through thousands of years ככבש אחד בין שבעים זאבים is not military strength but rather the strength of כאשר יענו אותם כן ירבה וכן יפרוץ, and in today's world with headlines like these EU births drop to new low as strains on younger ... - Financial Times Peak population may be coming sooner than we think - Financial … it should be clear that this is the ultimate strength.
On your next paragraph: 1. This is another Charedi hashkafa which I see you got, which is that we can appreciate the need for Neturei Karta even if we strongly disagree with them. In this way Charedim are more openminded than the DL community. It is unfortunate that in some Charedi circles these ideas are misrepresented as almost an endorsement of Neturei Karta, but it is also unfortunate that some can't relate to this concept at all. 2. I think Charedi politicians are often the worst. I think Americans are better at recognizing that than Israelis. This has to do with the general problem which Charedim have with relating to the outside world, in which those who do relate with the outside world tend to be not the best and the brightest and have high personal ambitions (though all politicians have that problem).
Once we're discussing I wanted to point out that I saw your interview on waltright and I believe you underestimated the charedi retention rate.
https://www.shoresh.institute/publication.html?id=Pub034 Figure 15 pg. 14
https://chotam.org.il/media/37347/demography-of-religiosity.pdf
So before I read that I would have said:
Chassidic outside Israel 95%
Litvish outside Israel 85%
Chassidic inside Israel 90%
Litvish in Israel 75-80%.
Those figures are interesting, but they are calculated by subtracting OTDs from Baalei Teshuva and I'd like to see some more nitty gritty. Does some junky who becomes Breslev, goes to live in Yavniel and has 12 feral children now count as 'charedi'? I presume the answer is yes.
The studies do break it up somewhat.
According to the shoresh statistics (figure 13 pg. 13) only 2% of Charedim become secular, 5% become Mesorati, and 6% dati.
According to the other study , רק % 2 (במסגרת טעות
הדגימה) עברו להיות מסורתיים לא כל כך דתיים – חילונים.
As to how to define 'Charedi' that is always a hard point. Yeah, I know you are very anti-Breslev.
The more you write, the more I feel you are adopting the Charedi viewpoint.
I was going to comment that on your Bibi post, which was essentially the time-honored Charedi position on all such matters; there is no long-term solution in sight so let's just keep kicking the can down the road.
Though I believe Charedim do have a path to a long-term solution. Based on this estimate https://www.jpr.org.uk/reports/haredi-jews-around-world-population-trends-and-estimates and this on Palestine https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38521087/ by the end of the century there should hopefully be 20x as many Charedi births in Israel as Palestine births. Demographic problem solved.
I think that my position is close to the classic Charedi non-extremist position, but obviously with a lot of elements that Charedim wouldn't except. As I like to say, Charedim are right about everything except Torah.
Ha, ha, you're not that far from me on this.
But seriously, I think even on the Torah issue you are moving closer to the Charedi position. You endorse daas Torah which is a charedi term.
And the more you adopt the Charedi position on social issues the more you must appreciate the wisdom of Charedi gedolim who came to these positions not through years of hocking with rightoids but through spending their life in Beis Medrash.
Additionally, the points where they are wrong on Torah are essentially the same points in which they are right on social issues. The Mesora and Daas Torah is not infallible and Hishtadlus does have a real effect. However, these hashkafos enable them to prioritize building communities and large families in a world which only values individuality and productivity.
However, I do believe Charedim have become somewhat a victim of their own success in that they attribute their phenomenal demographic success too much to irrationality. Reality will teach them. I just hope they don't take the wrong lessons (as you wrote in your other comment).
This is a minor quibble in the course of the essay, but in re the Sentinelese : it's not necessarily that it's their culture to kill outsiders, but rather that first contact with Europeans was disastrous (as for many Indigenous people). The last time I went on a Wikipedia wormhole about them, I came away with the impression that about a century ago they made the (rather prescient) judgement call that outsiders meant them harm, and have kept that memory. In the 80s(?) a group of anthropologists made progress toward contact, but governmental and organizational shit stymied the effort. Their ongoing isolation is as much a testament to the political situation in India as anything else.
That said, great essay :) It's stunning to me what a strange model of reality right-wing zionists seem to be working with. Just totally divorced from reality -- but then again, the illogic is a feature not a bug, as you pointed out.
Thanks, I didn't know any of that.
While PostKahanism is the most articulate English-speaking representative of Rightoid Zionism, he isn't exactly representative. Most of them either (a) fall back on miraculous intervention to make the sums add up or (b) are just too baboonish to appreciate what the issues are. Baruch has gone out on a limb in trying to think through what the plan actually is and for that, I suppose, he should be given a certain degree of credit.
“I’m a little on the spectrum, so I can take a step back and, leaving piety behind, appreciate the spiritual power of this, objectively speaking. I’m not really frum in that way, perhaps any way”
If there was one thing i could teach my fellow frum people, it would be the ability to tactically deploy this kind of self awareness when necessary. Baalei T’shuvah naturally have an advantage in this regard (having lived on “both sides of the fence” if you will), but that’s no excuse for the rest of us.